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COVENANT, THE FEAR OF FAILURE 
AND REVIVALS AS THE CONTEMPORARY SOURCES 
OF AMERICAN IDENTITY 
Th e relationship between religiosity and the American republic is uneasy, confused 
but at the same time exceptional among Western people. Th e American project had 
its distinctive features which colored the entire political culture. One of such features 
is the fact that unlike the European historical model American religious life, pre-
dominantly Christian, has been from the beginning maddeningly diverse, confusing, 
one could say, a profoundly baroque experience. It is wild, bizarre on the margins 
and even in the middle, unpredictable, experimental, complex, but robustly alive and 
full of passion. Modernity’s cultural code is battling particular American creeds, of-
ten pushing religion into a kind of justifi cation of one’s own autonomy choices. But, 
in turn, the creeds infl uence modernity’s claim of radical self-autonomy and moral 
auto-creation. Both infl uence politics and shape the religious clauses of the First 
Amendment accordingly.
Post-European Christianity in the New World
To begin with, the Americans had their modern project rooted in the covenant uni-
versal mentality of early Protestantism, that is Puritanism, which subsequently mani-
fested itself in American politics and culture. Th e fi rst colonies were to be the greatest 
experiment in post-European, and to a certain extent post-Reformation Christianity. 
Christianity for the “chosen people” in the New World. Th ere was thus from the be-
ginning a close relationship, albeit ridden with ambiguities, between the new colonies 
and their religious spirit which translated subsequently into the same relationship in 
the American republic, making Americans exceptional in their attitude to Christian-
ity and religion in general. Th e colonists felt chosen, authorized by Covenant to settle 
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and transform the New World but they could fail. Th e American political experi-
ment and its religiosity were thus at the beginning deeply interwoven, moreover both 
have since then exhibited profound features of neurotic fear of failure. It was for this 
reason that president Abraham Lincoln, the most biblical, prophetically tormented 
genius, expressing this connection between the American republic and the Covenant, 
was able to tap to the deepest sources of American identity. During the Civil War he 
used a phrase “the almost chosen people”. A possible failure of the Union he associat-
ed with the failure of God’s plan for America and the world, the plan breaking fi nally 
the spell of inhuman politics. In other words the American republican experiment in 
liberty would derive from its fi delity to nature and nature’s God, the idea expressed in 
the very Declaration of Independence of 1776. 
Th e cause of liberty was universal because liberty was true fact of natural law giv-
en to humans by God, and the plan was to begin with America. American faitfulness 
to Covenant was American patriotism, and vice versa, since they were natural, stem-
ming from the true, even if ordinary, passions of the people seeking and preserving 
liberty. For this reason the American constitutional system was from the beginning 
infused with a sense of being devised “for the ages”, not because it was perfect, but 
because in its general contours it refl ected the best possible regime securing an em-
pire of liberty which was refl ecting nature. Th e Constitution was thought to be based 
on a universal principle which guided its construction. As justice William Johnson 
wrote in his opinion in “Fletcher v. Peck” (1810) the constitutional system was draw-
ing upon “a general principle, on the reason and nature of things; a principle which 
will impose laws even on the Deity”. 
Th is somehow idolatrous comment, refl ecting, may be, a deistic inclination of its 
author, could yet be understood as a statement showing that nature, created and oper-
ated by God has an aim of bringing humanity to liberty by its own eff orts, hovewer 
imperfect. In other words liberty was the closest approximate to a peaceful and good, 
virtuous arrangement humanity could get on this side of existence, something which 
God defi nitely would not object too, even if off ended. Justice Joseph Story in “Terrett 
v. Taylor” (1815) stated “we think ourselves standing upon the principles of natural 
justice, upon the fundamental laws of every free government, upon the spirit and letter 
of the constitution”. Th us the U.S. Constitution was grounded not in mere ideology, but 
upon truths “in the nature of things”, that reason could discern. Th is deep conviction at 
the time of the founding, that men could discern “the nature of things”, was taken for 
granted. It was only later, beginning with the Progressivist thought that such a state-
ment was considered to be if not absurd, at least mistaken, and the “nature of things” 
was taken over by instrumental reason and “the historical process”, as guidelines to 
a proper ordering of political sphere and the conditions in which liberty could fl ourish.
Th e fi rst American settlers were animated by a divine and exceptional mission. 
But they brought that feeling from England. Next to the Bible the most read work 
among them was the Book of Martyrs by John Fox, which conveyed the myth that 
the English were the Elected Nation, and interpreted the accession of Queen Eliza-
beth I as a fi nal act of God’s providence, which saved the only true religion for all 
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the peoples of the world. Th is English exceptionalism as a site of true Christianity 
characterized the eff orts to legitimize and justify the eff orts of the Anglican Church 
and the king’s role as its head. Th us William Tyndale pronounced in 1528 that “he 
that resisted the King, resisted God”. Th e future bishop Hugh Latimer began to speak 
of “God of England” and the future bishop John Aylmer went one step further and 
overtly declared in 1559 that “God is English”. John Lyly stated unabashedly in 1580 
that “Th e living God is only the English God”. Th is doctrine of England as a site of 
true Christianity and the royalty as its savior, made a connection between a particu-
lar civilization and covenantal Christianity. It constituted kind of an offi  cial English 
ideology and was given wide popular acceptance by Fox’s book. 
In the 16th and 17th century most English people believed that their country ac-
cepted Christianity directly from Christ’s disciple Joseph of Arimathea, and that 
the Emperor Constantine was British. Th is was so because his mother Helena was 
a daughter of the British King Coilus, who had Christianized the whole world, ac-
cording to Fox, by “the help of the British army”.1 Protestant dissidents, among them 
the colonists, held to this myth which then metastasized into the New World. In 
1622, in a sermon to the Virginia Company, the Virginia colony being the most strik-
ing experiment in the post-European Christianity, John Donne, dean of St. Paul’s 
cathedral in London, declared: 
“Act over the acts of the Apostles; be you a Light to the gentiles, that sit in darkness. God taught 
us to make ships, not to transport ourselves, but to transport Him. You shall have made this 
island, which is but the suburbs of the old world, a bridge, a galley to the new; to join all to that 
world that shall never grow old, the kingdom of heaven”.2
But these deeply religious American settlers were of a special kind. Permeated by 
dissident Christianity of the most radical kind, they were escaping not only persecu-
tion but at the same time the closeness of a society in which they lived. Th ey were 
sons and daughters of radicalism fuelling religious individualists searching for God 
outside of the authority structures, not only the Catholic Church weakened by Prot-
estantism, but the very structure of established Anglican Protestantism, a seismic 
change of approach to God and the World which He created, a cultural revolution 
which soon was to explode in England into a political one. 
To cross the Atlantic Ocean required daring of soul and character, which com-
bined courage with a fi erce, not only political but fi rst of all spiritual independence. 
Th is was fi rst of all a religious, Christian independence, a new wild, rebellious mind, 
all that in the age of profound religious beliefs and equally religious disruptions, 
meshed with the similar social and political developments and rebellions. Dissent 
was the language of Christianity in the whole of Europe and this dissent produced 
the most daring stock of people to cross the Atlantic. Th ere was in them a spectacular 
mélange of character and faith which gave the new settlers a sense of possession of 
1 W. Haller, Foxe’s Book of Martyrs and the Elect Nation, J. Cape, London 1963; L. Stone, Th e Causes of 
the English Revolution 1529–1642, Harper Torchbooks, New York 1972, p. 88.
2 P. Johnson, Th e Almost Chosen People, “First Th ings”, June/July 2006, p. 17. 
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a profound truth, combined with unlimited possibilities to listen to no one but one’s 
own conscience and the Bible, a kind of a radicalized Lutheran cry “here I stand 
and cannot otherwise”. Th is spirit was born in England, sailed to America. Th is was 
a religious spirit propelling the faithful to perceive the world as within their power of 
transformation, but it went hand in hand, by sheer coincidence perhaps, with a feel-
ing of enormous possibilities connected with a development of Baconian science. But 
this radicalized spirit and a gnawing subconscious perception that the old world was 
crumbling, which infused the religious dissidents with a hubristic feeling that they 
were the new masters of the universe, had its darker side as well. It was a burning de-
sire of a tormented soul for certainty amid Christian violent divisions, a gnawing fear 
that the cosmos of Christianitas, of this cohesive world, where everything had a right 
place in a hierarchical order, was disintegrating. At the same time it was a fear that 
this frantic search for certainty amid a break of authority as an organizing principle 
was, instead of creating order, subverting in fact every facet of existing life, beginning 
with the Copernican revolution through a radical subversion of the divine right of 
kings and the pope. 
It was then, that John Donne gave an expression to this ontological shift  per-
meating every vestige of life, though and soul, this creeping sense of things falling 
apart. Once it was discovered that the Earth was not the centre of the solar system, 
the doubt arose whether it was indeed man who was God’s preeminent creation and 
a hierarchy formed by God was indeed an extension of His will. In a striking poem 
he declared 
“And new philosophy calls all in doubt...
‘Th is all in pieces, all coherence gone,
All just supply and all relation.
Prince, Subject, Father, Son are things forgot”3
Donne suggested a collapse of this inviolable cosmos of human existence, intimat-
ing an overthrow of the old authority patterns in both a state and society, beginning 
with religion and ending with family. Everything was for grabs again, a real birth of 
individualism and modern auto-creation. What came with that was an exhilarating 
feeling, at that dawn of this new humanity when, as Wordsworth said, it was “bliss... 
to be alive”, with all options for the mind and the body suddenly possible and self-jus-
tifi ed. Donne, as well as his nearly contemporary William Shakespeare, a literary gen-
ius of geniuses and a harbinger of modern insecurities, hubris, and hopes, gave only 
a poetic English expression to a radical revolution in thinking, soon to be formed into 
a political system of thought by Th omas Hobbes. On the continent in was expressed 
in diff erent ways by Machiavelli, Montaigne, Cervantes or Descartes. Individuality 
and independent consciousness, and with that onthological insecurity, was born. 
Th is consciousness meant in fact a radical dissent towards the very essence of 
the world. It meant a total and constant soul-searching and agonizing reappraisals 
of everything, an incessant, burning desire to get the world around oneself and one’s 
3 J. Donne, Poems, ed. J.C. Grieson, London 1912, p. 237–238.
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life in order, and an equally ineradicable eff orts to get to the very essence of Being by 
one’s own mental and material endeavors. Cosmos collapsed, hierarchy crumbled, 
but God and my soul existed, a dissident was only certain of that. “I was called to 
great tasks to recreate the world anew”, seemed to think a religious radical, “I was 
liberated”, all authority was spurious, a connection with God was not only spiritual, 
to the God of the Bible, the Saviour. Now this connection was immediate, evangelical, 
a burning, spiritual liberation which constituted at the same time a call to action in 
this world, an act of massive theological bringing up, the fi nal maturity of a Biblical 
wanderer limited by historical scaff olding. Th is was truly an anthropological break-
through having immense theological consequences, centuries before Karl Rahner 
gave it a solid German systemic description in the 20th century. But it was Edmund 
Burke in a famous “Conciliation with the Colonies” speech in Parliament in 1775, 
which captured this spirit of incessant rebellion transferred to America, observing 
that although “all Protestantism, even the most cold and passive, is a sort of dis-
sent (...) the religion most prevalent in our northern colonies is a refi nement of the 
principles of resistance; it is the dissidence of dissent, and the Protestantism of the 
Protestant religion”.4 
Th e times, as Donne observed in the 17th century, were trying human souls and 
were prone to incessant heresy and dissent. Deeply religious people, to paraphrase 
a famous defi nition of heresy by T.S. Eliot, were tempted by radical individualism of 
interpretation, of taking one particular theological doctrine, one idea, one impulse 
and pushing it into the most extreme logical conclusion making it a heresy. Th is con-
stituted a rebellious act fuelled by the logic of autocreation combined with a burning 
sense of being in the right, and seeking a possibility of transforming the world out-
side any authority, whether religious or political, not coming and not legitimized by 
an individual consent. It was this frame of mind, combined with the daring character 
of people who wanted to strike it ab ovo, which gave rise to a peculiar American 
stock, to people who were confi dent of being in the right, properly reading God’s will. 
Th ey had courage to act according to the utter boundaries of such a logic on the 
Chosen Land before their eyes, which was the virgin Paradise, not touched by delu-
sions, limitations and idleness of Europe. Th e colonists landed thus in America with 
a feeling of total corrosion of any state as well as religious authority and bore with 
them an incessant, question what was the meaning of this wild sectionalism and dis-
sent. And with that they bore its corollary, a question about the right road to salvation 
in the New World in which everything was for grabs and nothing seemed to have an 
immediate sense any more, where everything, beginning with land and ending with 
theological doctrines, had to be redefi ned anew. Th e answer to this search for mean-
ing in this sea of doubt and boundless mental and material possibilities was thus as 
simple as it was inconclusive and double: any meaning, or none at all. 
4 E. Burke, “Speech on Conciliation with America” (ed.) Joseph Villiers Denney, Scolt, Foreman, Chi-
cago 1892, p. 50–51.
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Europe tried to solve this issue of interwined metaphysical and political orders 
by combining absolutism with Christianity, making slowly the state to be an arbiter 
of faith, whether in its Catholic or Protestant versions. Th is was the very essence of 
the Augsburg Peace of 1555 with its rule Cuius Regio Eius Religio. Th is development 
was soon aided by political philosophy justifi cations of the omnipotence of the state 
by means of the doctrine of sovereignty, whether in Jean Bodin’s or Th omas Hobbes’s 
shape. A blessing duality of Christendom, the net structure of its Two Kingdoms of 
the Middle Ages Christianitas within which modern freedom could be born, was 
gone. Such a state having subordinated religion and making itself an absolute arbi-
ter of human lives, including their religious life, decidedly so in the Protestant case, 
much less so, but nevertheless, in the Catholic case, had only to make one last move. 
It had to eliminate any metaphysical competitor so the state could get an unrestrained 
adulation. It had to create a new metaphysical point of reference debasing the biblical 
one. Th is was done during the French Enlightenment, with reason in the service of 
a democratic liberal state, since then the source of any authority, with religion slowly 
being pushed into the confi nes of private superstition. 
But in America there was no one who could provide the coherent structure of 
the sovereign European state, as well as no religious authority. For a radical, fi ercely 
dissident, daring, religious stock of people, an answer to a question what was the 
right road to salvation could not be answered with a negative return to the monistic 
structure of authority, this time provided by the modern sovereign state. Th us began 
a fascinating American development of religious freedom, based on a passionate in-
dividualistic religiosity of diff erent Protestant sects, too weak to subordinate each 
other, two strong to yield to others, but having enough space and personal wealth to 
function in an unrestrained way in the public space of their own faithful, from whom 
there was always a possibility of an exit. Th e exit outside of it, on a road to establish-
ing one’s own denomination in conditions of a general lack of authority. In America 
there was no heresy, since every faith was in fact heretical.
In the conditions of the frontier society it was impossible to retain discipline of 
a sect in an organizational sense, as well as uniformity in terms of doctrine. Radical 
dissent run unchecked and could survive. Th is was, for instance, a case of Roger Wil-
liams who broke away from strict New England Calvinism and found Providence, 
Rhode Island, which he called “a shelter for persons distressed for conscience”. In Eu-
rope competing allegiances slowly were transferred to the secular state with doctrinal 
matters declining in practice. But in America there was no state, just goverments, 
and always a possibility of an exit from competing dissenting groups. Before this 
situation eventually solidifi ed itself into strong colonial and state churches, it gave 
a powerful impulse to identifi cation with a congregation of independent church, or 
sect as a local form of practical operation of social life. A congregation was the State 
and denominations were, in conditions of utter plurality, not confl icting with each 
other, but competing for the same faithful. 
But congregations were united in a particular way. It was a negative unity of es-
caping Europe, and a positive one of being given a New Land for settlement and 
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transformative conversion within plurality of faiths which could coexist. Th is forced 
everyone to cooperate and compete in the public, but at the same time permeated 
public life with a sense of importance and religious understanding of virtue, Chris-
tian virtue for all, without which the New World given as a task, could not be ordered. 
Not a particular doctrine, but the practical operation of faith in public within the 
wide perimeters of Protestant Christianity was a key to American religiosity and its 
missionary public character. Th e congregations stressed moral and behavioral side 
of human existence, not doctrine and theology, and because of this proclivity they 
never became the total societies of the European Christian model, mainly because 
they were led by lay people not the clergy. 
Th is situation created the main problem of democratic modernity in relation to 
religion of the creedal type like Christianity. It had already suff ered long term con-
sequence of theological populism with its emphasis on personal faith, understood 
in individualistic, not doctrinal terms, an observation made later by Tocqueville. In 
such a perspective Christianity and its doctrinal content became increasingly open 
ended, changing form. From a creedal faith through which an individual fi nds a way 
to Biblical God, it began to evolve to a faith which was becoming increasingly non-
creedal, meaning non-absolutist, all- inclusive, modest and nonjudgmental kind of 
spiritual psychotherapeutic faith of which another side was a pantheistic desire to be-
come spiritually one with nature. Th e seeds of such an understanding of Christianity 
were in America from the beginning, creating conditions for the fi rst individualistic 
type of faith in modernity, much later described by Peter Berger, as being late mo-
dernity’s refutation of the secularization thesis. Th e spiritual dimension of American 
virgin nature as a site of acting of God’s chosen people, fi lled such a modernistic ap-
proach to religion with a pantheistic awe. 
Th ese tendencies were to develop further in American history reaching its fulfi ll-
ment in the post 60’s “spiritual”, “psychotherapeutic” American society of the unlim-
ited consumerist choice in every sphere including fi nally one’s moral auto-creation 
amounting to a desire of a moment. Protestantism, dissent and America were at the 
same time aided by another powerful element of public life contributing to this pecu-
liar and powerful presence in public of religious, Christian denominations. From the 
beginning the public life was in fact anti-authoritarian, it had a democratic character. 
Th e radical and separationist groups of religious dissidents either went to America 
on their own, or were pushed out of Europe as illegitimate. Th e Puritans, diggers, Pil-
grim Fathers, Quakers, Mennonites and others found themselves in America either 
by crossing the Atlantic Ocean, or sometimes, through other, like Russia, routs. But 
because of the conditions of their operation, as well as because of the destination 
hardships, they were very cohesive and democratic groups. 
Th e people who traveled shared the same convictions, their access was voluntary, 
they were neither forced or born into them. Th is created conditions for democratic 
politics, not so much in terms of the procedures used, but in terms of the authorities 
chosen freely. Th us religious establishments in America were thus rather popular, 
not hieratic. A division between laity and clergy, the latter having no spiritual and 
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communal privileges and the former having them in excess was never sharp, and the 
orthodoxy of religious and social life, never reasserted itself. Th at is why there really 
was in America no inherent, let alone growing, jealous confrontation between the 
world of the sacred and the world of the profane, the secular and the ecclesiastical 
world. America was from the beginning not only Protestant, it was born this way 
with no historical background as a reference point against which to become Protes-
tant through revolt, as was the case in Europe. America’s WASP was not built
“on the remains of a Catholic Church or an establishment; it had no clericalism or anticlerical-
ism. In all these respects it diff ered profoundly from the Old World, which had been shaped 
by Augustinian principles and violent reaction to them. Th e word secular never had the same 
signifi cance in America as in Europe, because the word clerical had never conveyed an image 
of intolerance and privilege. America had a traditionless tradition, making a fresh start with 
a set of Protestant assumptions taken for granted [and] self-evident, as the basis for a common 
national creed”.5
For this very reason American religiosity has not, in principle, been antinomian, 
both in relation to democratic politics, and as well as in relation to a religion’s pub-
lic legitimate presence. Th e diverse religious, overwhelmingly Christian denomina-
tions, did not and do not still today defi ne their identity by means of language and 
doctrine which recognize democracy as a danger, a case which has been historically 
visible in the post-Enlightenment continental Europe, with a clear aim of imposing 
on democracy a dominant system of order. Th eir identity has in general been coter-
minous with democracy, it has thrived on it, and has shaped itself in social practice 
of serving public good. Th e institutional chains of command of any denomination 
which came from Europe very quickly dissipated, even the most visible hierarchical 
Anglican Church, as was the case, for instance in Virginia. Th is diminished the role 
of the local clergy, which in America has never had such an institutional power as 
in Europe. Th is diminished role of the clergy was an “original sin” already in the 
post-Reformation England which historically depended on a durability of the eco-
nomic and social order created by a confi scated Catholic property and the immedi-
ate authority of the king was pivotal to its maintenance. In the colonies the faithful 
quickly established their power to control the hierarchy and to make decisions, 
including fi nancial ones, and a local congregation became independent and strong. 
Th is experience led, for obvious reasons, even in the most traditional and hier-
archical denominations like the Catholic Church, to grass roots democracy and an 
eff ective marginalization, doctrinally, socially and fi rst of all culturally, of the clergy 
factor. Th is included the episcopate and institutions as such, with the public pres-
ence of democratic citizenry. A religious self-government “became a way of Ameri-
can development, shaping all the denominational circles. Even in case of American 
Catholicism this self-government gave a special character to Ecclesia, making it one 
of denominations”.6 Th is democratic spirit of the religious people was visible in May-
5 P. Johnson, Th e Almost..., p. 18.
6 B. Ostendorf, Religia i sfera publiczna w USA, “Teologia Polityczna” 2004–2005, no. 2, p. 60.
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fl ower Compact of 1620, which created authorities and laws based on consent given 
voluntarily, aft er fi rst establishing social and political community. Roger Williams’s 
1644 constitution for Rhode Island defi ned “the form of government established in 
Providence Plantations as democratic, that is to say a government held by the free 
and voluntary consent of all, or the greater part, of the free inhabitants”.7 It was Rhode 
Island as the fi rst commonwealth which established religious freedom as opposite of 
just mere tolerance of religion, formulating a theoretical principle and giving reasons 
for a separation of state and church as a precondition, in turn, for the unrestrained 
public religious freedom. Th is separation operated within the context of a strictly 
limited state structure, which was both independent from any state establishment, 
but at the same time benevolent to full religious presence in public and its partici-
pation in shaping social and cultural mores and fi rst of all language, such religious 
freedom engaged Enlightenment, soon to be secular, in a rational way as equal, an 
oddity from the point of view of the French Enlightenment and soon of the majority 
of the European liberal regimes. Th e Charter of Rhode Island of 1663 declared that:
“No person within the said colony, at any time hereaft er, shall be in any wise molested, pun-
ished, disquieted or called in question, for any diff erences in opinion in matters of religion, 
and who do not actually disturb the civil peace of our said colony; but that all...may from time 
to time, and at all times hereaft er, freely and fully have enjoy his and their own judgments and 
consciences, in matters of religious concernments”.8 
What is striking here, is not a language of tolerance and benevolent voluntar-
ism granted to the people of faith, but a language of piety and reverence towards 
religion as the very essence of fullness of human existence. Reverence, not only 
as a matter of private conscience against the secular state and public space, but as 
a matter of ontological certitude constitutive of the very essence of full public ac-
tivity, something which soon will be defi ned as full and equal citizenship. Th is had 
an additional practical consequence of guarding a voluntary adherence to religious 
faith as a guarantee of tolerance of all others. 
Th is guarantee was to be the basis of a proper and the only true foundation of 
social and public religious life, Christianity at fi rst, than any other religion. Th is grass 
root voluntarism and democratic impulse of American religious life went hand in 
hand with a democratic political development. Both exploded at the beginning of the 
19th century. Th is was the time of a great proliferation of religious groups, more and 
more voluntary and sectarian, a process which went hand in hand with a radical de-
mocratization of public life during the Andrew Jackson’s revolution, as well as an ac-
ceptance of the free market doctrine, symbolically recognized by the Supreme Court 
cases of John Marshall, ‘McCulloh v. Maryland”, “Dartmouth College v. Woodard” of 
1819, and later Roger Taney’s “Charles River Bridge Case” of 1837. As Gordon Wood 
remarked about the new denominations, at the beginning of the 19th century there 




“were not just Presbyterians, but Old and New school Presbyterians, Cumberland Presbyte-
rians, Springfi eld Presbyterians, Reformed Presbyterians, and associated Presbyterians; not 
just Baptists, but General Baptists, Regular Baptists, Free Will Baptist, Separate Baptists, Dutch 
River Baptists, Permanent Baptists, and Two-Seed-in the Spirit Baptists”.9 
Th us religious, political and economic voluntarism went hand in hand with an 
expression of an unrestrained life in the New World, the life of the fi rst people of 
modernity. At its centre stood an individual conscience and responsibility, looking at 
the outside world as a task of an unbound creation, an impulse which led increasingly 
to an individual moral auto-creation. At the same time, this cultural code imposed 
a duty to make the chosen, covenantal people responsible for progress in history. 
Individual voluntarism became a virtue to reshape the world anew, against any obsta-
cles of the old corrupted world. Th is was essentially a religious millenarian Christian 
impulse, brought to America by democratic Christian settlers. Th is religious volun-
tarism was prone to utopian Protestant spirit of egalitarianism, giving way to a demo-
cratic revolution of the 18th century, considering any rigid inequalities in politics, law, 
status as not acceptable. Religious pluralism and freedom of conscience gave way to 
market religiosity and hunting for worshippers, but that forced everyone to share 
a conviction that faith was constitutive to one’s well being as a public person, travel-
ling through diff erent routes towards the same goal of living full life in freedom and 
in faith at the same time. 
Freedom thus became increasingly depending on religious freedom as its pre-
condition, since it was religious freedom which gave Americans a sense of unique 
democratic and voluntary participation in God’s plan, the Covenant with Providence 
in America, against a corrupted Europe. Th is idea found its way into the natural law 
language of the Declaration of Independence which tied it to God of the Bible as the 
fi nal source and guarantee of freedom as such. Th us in the middle of the 17th century 
America made a sharp rupture with the European absolutist monarchies’ state wor-
ship, soon to give way to the state worship of the French Revolution, where religion 
was just a part of a tolerant framework of the secular state. 
Henry Vane, the former governor of Massachusetts was expounding this insepa-
rable nature of civil and religious liberty, arguing that freedom of religion as a pre-
condition of freedom as such, required this pietistic reverence for Christian society, 
in itself a source of democratic freedom. It was for this reason, in fact a very Augus-
tinian one, that 
“by virtue (...) of this supreme law [of religious liberty], sealed and confi rmed in the blood of 
Christ unto all men (...) al magistrates are to fear and forbear intermeddling with giving rule or 
imposing in those matters, which also meant, a revolution indeed, imposing a rule of a secular 
state on a Christian, that is free society”.10 
9 G.S. Wood, Th e Radicalism of the American Revolution: How a Revolution Transformed a Monarchi-
cal Society into a Democratic One Unlike Any Th at Ever Existed, A.A. Knopf, New York 1992, p. 332–333.
10 P. Johnson, Th e Almost..., p. 18.
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Vane’s document, expressed a new idea, that a democratic state and a voluntary 
religious life were friends, not enemies, supporting each other. 
It was then in the 17th century that this founding spirit of religious freedom as 
a precondition of free society for all, began to determine constitutional develop-
ments leading towards the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution’s First 
Amendment. Th e Enlightenment rational writings, Paine’s oratory or a powerful 
secular intellectual infl uence of Europe, could not thus penetrate this cultural code 
which made America the most religious, Christian, and at the same time the freest 
nation of the modern world with a right to shape one’s own existence in reverence 
for God, not because of state’s granting, defi ning its operation, but as the fi rst right 
of human existence. In such a light the First Amendment’s intent seems clear, not to 
protect the state against the religious people, and religion, but to protect religious 
people from the state. 
Th is Christian religious understanding was thus a political experiment, but it 
was an ontological and anthropological experiment as well. It was Augustinian in 
a sense that the most important duty of a state, was to provide conditions of a prop-
erly formed conscience. But for St. Augustine this state had to support the Church, 
instrumental in providing encouragement and punishment, so this conscience could 
properly be formed. Americans rejected this Augustinian second precondition of 
salvation. In this sense they were the fi rst religious people of modernity. It was not 
authority, not any rigid, institutionally defi ned doctrine, not any probing from the 
state which guaranteed properly formed individual consciences. It was an individual 
worship, a personal relation to Biblical God within the confi nes of a democratic con-
gregation working in unison to shape the New World, the Promised Land of God’s 
Covenant, shaping a proper conscience and securing salvation. 
“We the People”, as a congregation of faithful and “I” as a child of God, here in 
this society of the New World, were responsible for salvation and salvation of God’s 
plan for humanity. Th e energy which the state and the institutional church of Europe 
put into creating properly formed consciences was gone. In Europe it gave way to 
a bloody reaction against this unity of church and state, which restricted freedom 
and in a messianistic substitution made secularism a precondition of this freedom, 
and the state a friend of secularism against religion in public space. Th is has been 
an essence both of radical secularism of Europe, pushing religion into the confi nes 
of people’s private “superstition”, and of taking over a duty of providing salvation by 
secular means.
Covenant and the fear of failure
In America this responsibility for shaping conscience was taken from the institu-
tional settings, whether ecclesiastical, organizational as well as doctrinal, or the state 
sponsored. Forming of conscience was now solely a responsibility of an individual, 
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infused with the Christian spirit of freedom of the “chosen people” of modernity, 
escaping not only religious wars of Europe, but the utter irresponsibility of guided 
faith and paternalistically organized fate. To be a free man was also to be a free man 
of conscience to seek God. Fair enough, this was a Protestant idea. But to fi nd God, 
required nevertheless a Christian society created in freedom. Freedom of religion 
meant a burden of responsibility for one’s own salvation exercised by an individual in 
a society, which was a promise of a better life for humanity. Th is was the meaning of 
Abraham Lincoln’s famous defi nition of America as “the last best hope of mankind”, 
and “almost chosen people”. “Almost chosen” which meant a new society formed with 
free will to save itself and the world. 
Th is free society, God worshipping and benevolent towards all, was yet not “cho-
sen”, because there was nothing preordained about this experiment, it could fail if 
Americans failed. American religiosity might be very naïve, evangelical, devoid of 
doctrinal sophistication and ritual, putting a stress on individuality and a personal 
experience of transformation, but it was at the same time at its earnest in taking 
responsibility for the world around, and its transformation as a calling. Americans 
experience collective revivals, form religious associations and charities, give enor-
mous amount of money to charities, count on themselves, not on the state. Such 
a stance stems from this personal call treated as a duty towards God and society, be-
ing tantamount to an exercise in freedom, and today, an eff ort to wage a heroic battle 
to save one’s confused and fi lled with consumerism soul. Th is soul is obsessed with 
a fear of failure, socially and individually, the visible till today remnant of once over-
whelmingly Protestant, society. Americans constitute a society which has not ceded 
personal heroism of facing the world to the welfare state, and one of the reasons this 
has not happened is this religious, Biblical, responsibility which once shaped their 
cultural code. 
Th is combination of freedom, individualism and the Christian Covenant with God 
of the “almost chosen people”, gave Americans a burning sense of duty. Th is sense of 
duty infused them with a peculiar mesh of religious fervor applied to individual as well 
as collective transformations. At an individual level this has always been the recurring 
experiences of Great Awakenings and a desire to fi nd an immediate transformative 
redemption, beginning with the Pilgrims and ending with the modern evangelicals. At 
a collective level this has been an experience of treating any social reforms in America 
not only as religiously motivated, but also as religiously looked upon and dealt with, 
as crusades stemming from a great moral scandal of people who have off ended God 
by making short shrift  of his promise to them. Th ey thus have to try hard again and be 
faithful, if America was to be still the Promised Land. If they fail, they consider such 
defeats as failures of America and at the same time as failures of religious people of-
fending God. 
All great American reform movements have always been indignation crusades, 
at their society and themselves. Nearly all truly transforming reform movements in 
America started as great spiritual revivals, whether they had truly religious or secu-
lar shape. Such reform movements in the past could have a secular and even overtly 
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antireligious character, but their language, and hope of fulfi lling the prescribed task 
were inescapable religious, nay quintessentially biblical. Th e tone of the message was 
biblical. “We have sinned against a dream of America, we are guilty and crying for for-
giveness, correction and atonement” have shouted Americans through centuries. Th is 
has happened irrespectively whether this religious, biblical, eschatological language 
has made direct references to betrayal of God, his Covenant with America as an ideal 
community, something visible in the speeches of Garrison, Lincoln, Bryant, King or 
Reagan, or whether this biblical, eschatological language has been secular as was the 
case with Norman Th omas, Lyndon Johnson or recently Richard Rorty.11
Americans combined this universality with a secularized universal project of the 
Enlightenment social contract and its conception of rights. Th e Declaration of Inde-
pendence of 1776, the founding document of a new polis testifi es to that. Because of 
this unique combination Americans have a natural tendency to analyze their democ-
racy not only in the light of original political ideas, at the expense of the historical 
evolution and forms they have taken, but also in the light of a particular religious 
promise, however secularized, which gave these original rights a sense of messian-
ism, a feeling of being on the right side of history. Such a mentality is resistant to any 
form of disenchantment although it is prone to a constant soul searching and a quasi 
religious fear of failure, of breaching the terms of God’s covenant and a sense of being 
owned by forces of impersonal control, which the greatness and limitless opportuni-
ties of America and the implicit pull of individual strivings elicited. Th is fear of fail-
ure, of moral and social decline is not of course uniquely American. What is rather 
distinctly American is this double idea of 
“failing a past standard of basic character and a past commission to build on that character: 
to fulfi ll it, and, more than fulfi ll it, to progress (...) [this] fear of falling away aff ects them, 
for it runs through the culture, surfacing in countless campaign speeches and valedictorian 
addresses. In its celebration of change and progress it is an existing burden, but a burden it 
remains, for at any time Rocket America may take a false bearing. Indeed the very industri-
ousness and energy of the nation can betray it here the fear of winding down diverges from 
the fear of falling away or deplete it so that the people can lose both vigor and virtue. Th e 
notion of America as a special ark of Providence-defender of freedom and shining light of 
progress-creates anxiety as well as hope. When John Winthrop uttered the famous words in his 
shipboard sermon of 1630 ‘we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us’, 
he added the swift  negative ‘so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have 
undertaken and so cause him to withdraw his present help from us, we shall be made a story 
and a by-word through the world’. It is true that Winthrop and the earliest Puritan settlers had 
a particular sense of being watched, by Europe as well as by God. But that sense never died, and 
since America has become a world power, the idea of being on show and test before the world 
has revived. Th e fear of failure before an audience is obviously more secular than Winthrop’s 
version, but the shift  is only relative: the idea remains both religious and political. Th e idea of 
failing away does not always point to a particular generation that has set the standard for its 
successors. For some people there is just a sense of decline from ‘how things used to be. Nor 
is there total agreement among those who do refer to a specifi c set of forebears. Some refer to 
11 R. Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Left ist Th ought in Twentieth-Century America, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA 2002.
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their parents’ or grandparents generation; others are more likely to summon a mid-nineteenth 
century picture, of frontier settlers, perhaps of Victorian entrepreneurs. Th e most common 
public references, however, are to the era of the Founding Fathers and the fi rst few decades of 
the Republic (...). Th e rights and goals announced in the Declaration of Independence and in 
the Preamble to the Constitution could not be perfectly fulfi lled. Th ey would always, therefore, 
be a challenge to future generations to improve on the past”.12 
For Winthrop this danger of falling away from God’s ‘special commission’ was 
inseparable from a neurotic urgency to hold together in dire straits as well as in abun-
dance, with caring and generosity blunting materialist ambition and making wealth 
diff erences a source of more moral obligation than pride. Colonial New England 
Puritanism valued productive work bringing material rewards, but scorned luxuries 
and moneymaking worship as a distraction from God’s community.13 “Will you tell 
me”, wrote John Adams in 1819, “how to prevent riches becoming the eff ects of tem-
perance and industry. Will you tell me how to prevent riches from producing luxury? 
Will you tell me how to prevent luxury from producing eff eminacy, intoxication, ex-
travagance, vice and folly”.14 Too much commerce, money and consumption would 
produce greed and dependence, would corrupt character and a soul, bringing debili-
tating decadence. A century and a half aft er John Winthrop, John Kennedy expressed 
the same fear:
“the very abundance which our dynamism has created has weaned and wooed us from the 
tough condition in which, hence to fore, we have approached whatever it is we have had to 
do. A man who has extra fat will look doubtfully on attempting the four minute mile; a nation 
replete with goods and services, confi dent that ‘there’s more where that came from’ may feel 
less ardor for questing”.15 
For many this fear of failure meant a call to incessant, neurotic striving. Freder-
ick Robinson, a Democratic state legislator and party leader in Massachusetts in his 
July 4 speech to Boston Trades Union in 1834 thundered that “the condition of the 
people can never remain stationary. When not improving they are sinking deeper 
and deeper into slavery. Eternal vigilance alone can sustain them, and never ceasing 
exertion is necessary for their social and political improvement”.16
12 R. Wilkinson, Th e Pursuit of American Character, Harper & Row, New York 1988, p. 80–81; on this 
fear of failure see: P. Miller, Errand into the Wilderness, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1956; 
M. Cunliff e, American Watersheds, “American Quarterly” 1961, no. 13, p. 480–494 and S. Bercovitch, Th e 
American Jeremiad, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1978, also idem, Th e Rites of Assent: Rhetoric, 
Ritual, and the Ideology of American Consensus [in:] S.B. Girgus (ed.) Th e American Self: Myth, Ideology, 
and Popular Culture, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque 1981.
13 J. Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity [in:] D.J. Boorstin (ed.), An American Primer, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago 1966, p. 26–43.
14 Letter to Th omas Jeff erson, December 11, 1819 [in:] L.J. Cappon (ed.), Th e Adams–Jeff erson Letters, 
University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1959, vol. II, p. 549.
15 We Must Climb to the Hilltop, “Life”, September 26, 1960.
16 J.L. Blau (ed.), Social Th eories of Jacksonian Democracy: Representative Writings of the Period, 1835–
–1850, Liberal Arts Press, New York 1954, p. 320; R. Wilkinson, Th e Pursuit..., p. 87.
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Th ere was also another element of this fear of falling, expressing itself through 
a pull of individualism and resistance to church control, strengthened by a distance 
from the seats of authority in Europe, and a lack of social structures preventing fi nd-
ing a free space. It made more and more people living their own lives, both economi-
cally and spiritually, since such a possibility was constantly, unlike in Europe, open. 
Th is idea of nonconformist rebellion was personifi ed, for instance, by Anne Hutchin-
son who used her church’s tradition to be challenged by her own religious experience. 
It convinced her about a necessity of rejecting church authority in matters of worship, 
corresponding to this neurotic horror of losing the promise of God’s covenant, the 
fear of being owned by impersonal forces. Th is apprehension was turned, as a reli-
gious principle, against churches’ institutional authority, at the same time a source 
of American religious proliferation of denominations and sects, rooted in personal 
righteousness vis a vis God. 
A theme of falling of the New Israel from the exceptional biblical charge to them, 
and from the alleged virtue of the founding settlers, was a constant warning of the co-
lonial clergy. For the Calvinists this fear of failure and corruption was especially pow-
erful, because of their doctrine of grace, one could never be sure about being saved. 
To think otherwise was a grave sin of pride. As a consequence of such fear of falling, 
there emerged in Massachusetts and other colonies a particular type of sermon, the 
election day sermon – a jeremiad. Th e clergy addressing a minister in the new legis-
lature would assess a spiritual state of the commonwealth, on many occasions scold-
ing their audience for falling away and apart, for depleting great opportunities given 
to them. Such a sermon had a particular structure, celebrating the new arrival and 
coming together of the elected, looking with apprehension backward to assess the 
imperfect present, and looking then into the future with hope of getting out of dire 
straits. In the 1770s, election sermons were tied with the rhetoric of Revolution, with 
an idea of the New World vibrancy and virtue set against the Old World’s corruption 
and political oppression, the charges having then overtly political intent.17  
Th is fi ght for liberty was tied to a call for moral regeneration against the horror 
of moral backsliding. Th e Revolution was shaped then by this ethic of failure and 
regeneration. Failure and regeneration were the polar deadly opposites interposed 
on another one, power and liberty. Th is idea was taken from the seventeenth-century 
English radicals. It was weakness and lust of human nature which made power an 
aggressive threat to liberty in constant danger, with people always prone to slavery. 
A visible presence of slavery in America corroborated this. For this reason despotism 
was not only connected with unlimited power, it was a form of degeneration, when 
17 See E. Sandoz (ed.), Th e Sermons of the American Revolution, Liberty Press, Indianapolis 1997; 
A.W. Plumstead (ed.), Th e Wall and the Garden: Selected Massachusetts Election Sermons, 1670–1775, Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1968. Th e latter attributed this fear of falling apart directly to the 
sermons’ jeremiads, not the latter refl ecting a deep cultural code. See also P. Miller, Th e New England Mind: 
From Colony to Province, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1953, chapter 2, 3 documenting also 
resistance and alternatives to the jeremiad.
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liberty was a form of rebirth.18 Tyranny was sowing discord and was seditious by 
itself. 
No wonder that Th omas Jeff erson, when he was writing the Declaration of Inde-
pendence structured it as a bill of equity against the British king, combining criticism 
of his tyranny with anarchy dangerous to liberty. He did this in the best Tory tradition 
of satire against factional dissent. Jeff erson wrote that the king had “excited domestic 
insurrections amongst us” exposing the colonies to internal “convulsions” and pre-
vented the enactment of necessary laws.19 In other words tyranny corrupted liberty 
because tyranny was incapable of establishing conditions of virtue without which 
liberty also could not thrive. For Jeff erson liberty 
“was held in check by all reasonable men by his sense of duty to his moral compass and to 
society which guaranteed happiness, not by being prey to animal or material desires. Liberty 
was the ultimate result of moral virtue, and corruption of it, caused as a consequence of vir-
tue’s destruction, was also a danger to the promise of the American society being universal, in 
a sense that for the fi rst time enabled men to pursue a goal of moral virtue, if they want to”.20 
America thus created a civilization, which started a revolution to make possible 
political conditions necessary for virtuous life, a “regime” not only for themselves, 
but on behalf of mankind. In comparison to the revolutions that followed, this was 
a moderate one, and perhaps for that reason it has proved more lasting. Th e mod-
eration consisted in not seeking a perfect substitute for the virtue that the ancients 
described, but leaving an opportunity for virtue. Th e constitutional system was to be 
created to enable just that.
America in that sense had been “more successful than other regimes by not try-
ing to guarantee success. When you rely on virtue to appear, you may not get it. But 
when you do not rely on virtue, you have to make a new man, the totalitarian idea 
which J.J. Rousseau gave birth”.21 Tyranny meant thus a failing of virtue and liberty 
at the same time, the failing apart of the whole American promise of the New Israel. 
Sedition was thus tyrannical and the authors of the Constitutions wanted to eliminate 
factionalism and popular “passions”, which in the parlance of the 18th century meant 
too much democracy, that is the rule of the mob. Passions unchecked could produce 
the tyranny of the majority, something which George Washington in his Farewell 
Address called a “frightful despotism”, the “alternate domination of one [vengeful] 
18 See on this constant theme B. Bailyn, Th e Pamphlets of the American Revolution, Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1968, also idem, Th e Ideological Origins of the American Revolu-
tion, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1968, chapter 2, 3; J.P. Reid, Th e Concept 
of Liberty in the American Revolution, Th e University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1992.
19 See on that E. Hoff er, Equity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1986; S. Fender, American 
Literature in Context, vol. I, 1620–1830, Methuen, London–New York 1983, p. 97–121; R. Wilkinson, Th e 
Pursuit..., p. 87.
20 D. Freeman Hawke, A Transaction of Free Men: Th e Birth and Course of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, Da Capo Press, New York 1988, p. 51–52.
21 H.C. Mansfi eld, Political Philosophy, ISI Books, Wilmington 2001, p. 42.
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faction over another”. Factions were thus to be checked by the “extended republic” 
mechanism of James Madison’s Federalist 10. 
In the Jacksonian and post-Jacksonian America, increasingly dominated by the 
party reformulation, a new breed of politicians turned to political managers and the 
shameful “spoils system”. Slavery commentators were obsessed with comparisons 
to the generation of the Founding Fathers, wondering whether the Americans were 
worthy of their revolutionary forebears and, whether they were undoing by their di-
visiveness all that they worked so hard to achieve. Th e very stability of the constitu-
tional system was in doubt, a mood expressed even by the most farsighted and com-
mitted to the preservation of the union people like John Marshall or Joseph Story. 
Th e Constitution was traditionally bound in the American minds with the Union, 
both as a concept and reality. Th e two were commonly linked in public rhetoric as 
a “sacred inheritance”, the idea found in the speeches of the most important public 
fi gures like Madison in his political testament, John Marshall in his most famous 
Supreme Court utterances, in the speeches of the Whigs like Daniel Webster, or abo-
litionists like Owen Lovejoy. Th e same theme used for diff erent purposes reverber-
ated in the speeches of Southerners and Northerners alike before the Civil War. Jef-
ferson Davies speaking in Boston in 1858 declared that “we became a nation by the 
Constitution: whatever is national springs from the Constitution; and national and 
constitutional are convertible terms”.22 
But the fear of failure of the constitutional system began to creep into utterances 
of public fi gures. Horace Binney, a member of Congress delivering an eulogy for John 
Marshall before the Select and Common Councils of Philadelphia in 1835, respond-
ing to recent sectional tensions “seized the occasion to point to the Union, established 
by the Constitution, as the only ark of safety”. Another politician with abolitionist 
sympathies William H. Seward of New York doubted that the Constitution itself was 
an adequate document to express the essence of the American hope and experiment, 
since although “the Constitution devotes the domain to union, to justice, to defense, 
to welfare and to liberty (...) there is a higher law than the Constitution, which reg-
ulates our authority over the domain”.23 Many argued along the same line that the 
Constitution was man-made, whereas America, the Union had been God-made. 
Th erefore they elevated it above the Constitution. In January 1861, some expressed 
doubts on this point, for instance senator Robert Toombs of Georgia, who termed the 
customary link between the Union and the Constitution “nonsense”, explaining that 
“union under the Constitution of 1787 had not been an adequate bond”.24
Th ere was in all such utterances a perceived dissonance between the Constitu-
tion as a cultural system, rationalized in various ways, and the Constitution seen on 
a separate plane as a practical system. A development of that discrepancy between the 
applied Constitution and the symbolic Constitution “has become a constant theme 
22 M. Kammen, A Machine Th at Would Go of Itself, Knopf, New York 1987, p. 62.
23 Ibidem, p. 63.
24 Ibidem.
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of worry till today”.25 Th e Constitution emerged as a national symbol between 1789 
and 1860 and also as an instrument of governance, the former expressing hopes con-
nected with the uniqueness of the American experiment, the latter treated essentially 
as an instrument of restraint and a guardian of federalism. Th is tension between the 
two approaches to constitutionalism has always been visible in American history. 
Th e fi rst made the Constitution a vehicle of American promise and a necessary in-
strument on the way to fulfi ll its potential, a sine qua non condition of making the 
Americans worthy of their eschatological task. Charles Pickney of South Carolina 
made this point at the Philadelphia Convention.26 James Fenimore Cooper expressed 
this feeling in 1830 writing from Europe that “we are unique as a government, and we 
must look for our maxims in the natural corollaries of the Constitution”. 
In 1850 Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote in the same vein, reminiscent of 
the future German post World War II constitutional patriotism, that the U.S Con-
stitution “is all that gives us a NATIONAL character”.27 Herbert Croly expressed the 
same sentiment half a century later when in Th e Promise of American Life he urged 
American liberalism to change itself into an instrument of reform, with constitution-
al mechanism becoming a vehicle of national greatness and progress, kind of “living 
constitution”, combining this symbolic meaning of the Constitution with its practi-
cal utility to fulfi ll it promise. It was a time when the Supreme Court became heav-
ily politicized, especially in the critical Progressive era years of 1911–12. Th e word 
“usurpation” became a battle cry of the reformers, still not accepting the precedent of 
“Marshall v. Madison” of 1803. 
Th e critics began yet to say that the courts pretending to interpret the Constitu-
tion, were in fact disregarding “constitutional morality”, which was there to ensure 
that the American promise would be realized. Th is phrase was not clear in 1912, but 
it was used in a context of impatience with traditional restrains upon governmental 
change, in this context the Supreme Court, clearly guilty of disregarding “constitu-
tional morality”. Th e phrase became a battle cry in the 20’s and once again became 
visible in the context of the Great Crisis and the New Deal.28 Th e most infl uential 
constitutional scholar of the fi rst half of the 20th century Edward S. Corwin published 
in 1936 an essay, which quickly became a classic at the height of the New Deal contro-
versy: Th e Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol. Corwin stressed this dual role of 
the Constitution and this inherent tension between two meanings of it in the Ameri-
can political culture, arguing that the Constitution was a vehicle of change because it 
was a symbol regarded by Americans as culturally determinative, thus as a document 
in need of constant use in response to changing circumstances. Th erefore “revision 
of the constitutional symbol there must be (...) to bring it into conformity with the 
25 Ibidem, p. 67.
26 M. Farrand (ed.), Th e Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
CT 1937, vol. I, p. 398–399.
27 M. Kammen, A Machine..., p. 94.
28 Ibidem, p. 204.
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constitutional instrument, regarded as the instrument of a people’s government and 
of a unifi ed nation which has yet lost faith in its political destiny”.29 
For this reason, to treat the Constitution as merely an instrument of restraint, as 
an institutional embodiment of “constitutional negativism”, as some organizations 
like Liberty League or the conservative Supreme Court during the fi rst stages of the 
New Deal thought, was in such a perspective untenable.30 Th e Constitution was not 
only an instrument of constrains keeping the American society to the devices of their 
own organic development. It was an integral mechanism of making this organic de-
velopment, propelled by the original American messianism, capable of meeting the 
challenges of the present and the future. Th e Constitution and “governmental power 
must be as little embarrassed by boundary lines”.31
Americans Messianic Destiny as Political Destiny
Th is symbolic nature of the Constitution was at the same time concrete, institutional. 
Th e instrument was both a symbol and a vehicle of change, to make its potential 
rooted in the American promise realized. History was going to be a testing ground 
of this messianistic urge, and history was on the “American side, since God was on 
their side”.32 An American diplomat Albert Gallatin in his speech of 1847 against the 
Mexican War, raised moral concerns with regard to a newly coined notion of the 
American Manifest Destiny. He considered this idea to be a dangerous perversion 
of Americans, who having a mission, had always been in danger of confusing self-
interest with morality: 
“Your mission is to improve the state of the world, to be the model republic’ to show that men 
are capable of governing themselves, and that the simple and natural form of government is 
that also which confi rms most happiness on all, is productive of the greatest development of 
the intellectual faculties, above all, that which is attended with the highest standard of private 
and political virtue and morality”.33 
Such an attitude makes Americans self-conscious of their mission and at the same 
time prone to self doubt and boasting. Americans, wrote an English cultural critic in 
1888 had agreed, as people,
29 R. Loss (ed.), Corwin on the Constitution: Th e Foundations of American Constitutional and Political 
Th ought, the Powers of Congress, and the President’s Power of Removal, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
1981, p. 179.
30 Ibidem, p. 169.
31 Ibidem, p. 179. Corwin applied this to economic reforms but the tone of his article was essentially 
extremely activist in all spheres of life, in fact the reality of contemporary administrative state.
32 M. Henry, Civil Th eology in the Gnostic Age: Progress and Regress, “Th e Modern Age”, Winter 2005, 
p. 38.
33 A. Gallatin, Peace with Mexico [in:] F. Church, Th e American Creed: A Spiritual and Patriotic Primer, 
St. Martin’s Press, New York 2002, p. 68.
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“to deceive themselves that they have what they have not, to cover the defects in their civiliza-
tion by boasting, to fancy that they well and truly solve, not only the political and social prob-
lem, but the human problem too. One would say that they really hope to fi nd in tall talk and 
infl amed entailment a substitute for that real sense of elevation which human nature instinc-
tively craves. Th e thrill of awe, which Goethe pronounces to be the best thing humanity has, 
they would fain create by proclaiming themselves at the top of their voices to be ‘the greatest 
nation upon earth’, by assuring one another, in the language of their national historian [George 
Bancroft ], that American democracy proceeds in its ascent ‘as uniformly and majestically as 
the laws of being’ and is as certain as the decrees of eternity”.34
American democracy has thus been, from the beginning extremely political. It 
understands itself as a territory of a fi erce battle over its true shape, its real character, 
and over a proper fulfi llment of its ideal. Th is battle has engaged many sides in Amer-
ican history with a heated moral rhetoric. Beyond rhetoric these arguments have 
always had a hidden dimension of the unrealized promise of the American dream 
and at the same time fear, that God’s Covenant and the very republican experiment 
which was to secure it could be wasted. Th e rhetoric of the 18th century opposition to 
the imperial rule stressed this corrosive element of British policies to the promise of 
America embodied in the Covenant. 
Th e revolutionary drive in the 18th century was caused by a breach of the an-
cient rights and republican mores by the king’s government. Th e reorganization of 
the colonies in the aft ermath of the French-British War of 1756–1763 was driven by 
an idea of strengthening the administrative control within the Imperial Constitution 
and clashed with the colonists’ perceptions of being governed by the ancient balanced 
constitution. Part of this conviction was a lack of the king’s colonial bureaucracy 
which made their dependence on the local communities and the juries something 
taken for granted. Th is dependence was much greater than in England where the lo-
cal oligarchies were in charge of a political process35. Th e revolutionary confl ict was 
defi ned as a confl ict between bureaucracy and executive power of the English corrupt 
government and the self-governing people. Th ey in comparison with Europe of de-
partments, boards, agencies, common law courts, corrupted trade and tariff  system, 
experienced a real sense of freedom. Th e new measures from London, were treated 
as a blatant violation of their ancient customs.36 
Th e confl ict was thus from the beginning defi ned in terms of insurmountable 
opposition between the imperial “despotic administration of government” and the 
uncooperative, independent, self-governing by ancient custom colonists.37 
Th e crown also closed the frontier in 1763, drawing a sharp line in the West against 
the colonial expansion, which made them beyond the reach of Americans pioneers. 
Th is measure became immediately a symbolic aff air. It threatened the New World 
34 M. Arnold, Civilization in the United States [in:] Ch. Ricks, W.L. Vance (eds.), Th e Faber Book of 
America, Faber and Faber, London 1992, p. 249–250.
35 W.E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 
1979, p. 14–15.
36 E. Morgan, Th e Birth of the Republic: 1763–89, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1977, p. 36.
37 Ibidem, p. 54, 4.
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expansion considered by the colonial mythology to be one of the crucial means to 
upkeep and regenerate the republican societies of the yeomen farmers. In addition 
London made exceptions to the prohibition of expansion to speculators with political 
pull, which brought the ever present specter of British political corruption, as con-
trasted with the colonial virtue, an immediately explosive rallying point. 
Moreover, the Quartering Act in April 1765 required the colonial assemblies to 
billet British troops in empty barns and warehouses which brought the horror of 
standing armies in peace time, typifying the absolutist monarchy. Last but not least, 
the British parliament levied taxes, which nullifi ed the basic English right that taxes 
were off ered by consent.38
Th e colonists responded with their own cry of no taxation without representa-
tion.39 In the colonies confl ict was rife, with representatives having a distinctly local 
view. Th e colonial representation was unsteady, fractious, open, in fl ux, fi ercely lo-
cal40. In contrast the English politics and representation was stable, hierarchical and 
ultimately harmonious, with some spice provided by the court intrigues and cor-
ruption, which was not treated as a great off ence at the time, the fi rst anticorruption 
laws being introduced only in 1792.41 But this fi erce spirit of American messy local 
politics caused, that all the repressive London measures culminating with the Stamp 
Act brought the colonists fi nally “out of the doors” with local committees, national 
congresses, mass meetings and sheer mobs beginning to act in the name of the peo-
ple, by passing the formally constituted institutions and seizing political authority 
and vesting it in ad-hoc, extra governmental political organisms, for instance the 
Sons of Liberty. Th us began the search for
“extralegal mechanisms to empower the people directly and [which] would animate the revo-
lutionary struggle and become one of the major political legacies. Th e Revolution introduced 
a pattern that would be repeated, in all kinds of variations, throughout American history. Un-
derlying tensions create dissatisfaction and unease. Th e MYTH OF THE LOST ERA in which 
political and social mobility rested on virtue gains popular currency. Th e tensions are con-
verted into political action aft er villain is charged with violating the always evolving norms of 
popular rule. Th e indictment [against the powers that be] is cast in the name of ‘the people’ 
who are repeatedly, almost ritualistically, called to reassert their rightful place. Th e people, that 
united, consensual collectivity of classical republicanism-forms the linchpin of this democratic 
faith and the American pattern of political revolt”.42
Th e creed was to be reasserted by the mythical people as its collective eternal guard-
ians, the idea powerfully expressed in the 9th Amendment to the federal Constitution 
of 1787. Th us the common American heritage created consensus at the level of an idea 
38 E. Burke, Th e English Constitutional System [in:] H. Pitkin (ed.), Representation, Atherton Press, 
New York 1969, p. 175–176.
39 H. Pitkin, Th e Concept of Representation, University of California Press, Berkeley 1972, p. 60–61.
40 B. Bailyn, Th e Ideological Origins..., p. 64.
41 S. Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age, Random House, New York 1965, p. 19–32.
42 J.A. Morone, Th e Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American Government, 
Basic Books, New York 1990, p. 52–53.
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and cultural code, but this exceptionalism of a nation based on a particular creed, has 
not meant that there was no confl ict. Th e foundational myth has constantly caused 
civil wars over its interpretation with intensity in the media, society and politics simi-
lar only to the once violent religious wars between the orthodox and heretics.43 Th us, 
in a society, founded both on a religious Covenant and a political revolution, with 
a constant reinterpretation of the creed, there have always been attempts to confi rm, 
renew or reinterpret foundational values. Such values usually
“involve elements of purifi cation, Puritanism, mass participation, egalitarianism and the re-
neval of moralistic devotion. In various periods of American history the level of creedal pas-
sion has increased generally throughout the body politic. New generations deeply concerned 
with the gap between the ideal and practice supplant earlier generations that were deeply con-
cerned to bring reality in accord with principle. Th e question how does [one] reconcile his 
belief in American values with his perception of American reality is inescapable”.44 
Americans oft en fi ght violent civil wars to defend their interpretations of the same 
creed. Savcan Bercovich one of the students of the Puritan origins of the American 
psyche, coming from Canada to the United Stated in the 60’s, was shocked by the 
intensity of the fi ght over interpretations of the American heritage. He observed
“I found myself inside the myth of America, a country that despite its arbitrary frontiers, bewil-
dering mix of race and creed, could believe in something called the True America, and could 
invest that patent fi ction with all the moral and emotional appeal of a religious symbol. It gave 
me something of an anthropologist’s sense of wonder at the symbol of the tribe. To a Canadian 
skeptic, a gentile in God’s country... [here was] a pluralistic, pragmatic people bound together 
by an ideological consensus. It was a hundred sects and factions, each apparently diff erent from 
the others, yet all celebrating the same mission”.45 
Th ese civil wars to defend particular interpretations of the same creed, and at the 
same time a defense of a particular kind of exceptionalism and universalism refl ects 
an astounding American ability to engage in deep confl icts over political and cul-
tural ideas, while at the same time reducing adversarial positions to legitimate deriva-
43 See S.M. Lipset, Consensus and Confl ict: Essays in Political Sociology, Transaction Books, New 
Brunswick, New Jersey 1985, p. 1–109.
44 S.P. Huntington, American Politics: Th e Promise of Disharmony, Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, MA 1981, p. 131, 85, 84. Gunnar Myrdal had similar criteria of looking at politics of 
the US, explaining, for instance the sources of the civil rights revolution as a confl ict between the Ameri-
can creed and practice. G. Myrdal, An American Dilemma: Th e Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, 
Harper & Row, New York 1944, p. 4. Socialist and postmodernist Richard Rorty looks at the source of 
American passion for reform the same way, titling his book to corroborate his point. R. Rorty, Achieving 
Our Country... Samuel Huntington formulated this return to original sources in a diff erent, paradoxical 
way, when he remarked that “critics say that America is a lie because its reality falls so far short of its ide-
als. Th ey are wrong. America is not a lie; it is a disappointment. But it can be disappointment only because 
it is also a hope”. Ibidem, p. 262. What he wanted to say was simply, that great disappointments are usually 
proportionate to greatness. What America promised is implied in what is criticized, its failures to be all it 
promised
45 S. Bercovitch, Th e Rites of Assent..., p. 5–6; also S.M. Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-
Edged Sword, W.W. Norton, New York 1996, p. 291. 
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tions of American history and development.46 At the same time the founding myth 
of America is perceived as fully rational, because, as Allan Bloom remarked America 
was formed by
“the Framers (...) reasonable men (...) not prophets, poets, or heroes. Other men were not 
required to believe what they heard from the Framers but had merely to look at what they 
pointed to and judge for themselves. Convinced that they had the best of any discussion about 
the good regime, the Framers (...) challenged [everyone] to meet them on the fi eld of reason...
to test their conviction. (...) Th is is the peculiarly American form of patriotism (...) our regime 
is founded on arguments not commands. Obedience to its fundamental law is not against rea-
son, and it can claim to have resolved what was thought to be the irresolvable tension between 
good citizenship and philosophizing”.47 
Both the ideological and rational sides of the American creed meant a futuristic, 
individualistic project understood as progress, liberating individuals from all artifi -
cial shackles. Th is was a distinctly Enlightenment modern code. Its political expres-
sion was an idea of a democratic, republican liberty in practical, not just imagined 
like in France of 1789, operation.48 
Th e American creed, this futuristic, modern project was thus founded on an idea 
of a nearly religious faith in the unlimited possibilities of human mind and spirit to 
create the world anew. But to create the world anew entailed a possibility of a better, 
permanently improved man, a strikingly modern idea wrapped in a traditional bibli-
cal language. Capitan Roger Clapp, who ran military defenses for the colony of Mas-
sachusetts, wrote this striking passage in 1680, surely a refl ection based on a public 
knowledge of a phenomenon when he addressed the colonists:
“You have better food and raiment than was in former times: but have you better hearts than your 
forefathers had? If so, rejoice in that mercy, and let New England then shout for joy. Sure, all the 
people of God in other parts of the world, that shall hear that the children and grandchildren 
46 Th is adversarial role of confl icts as legitimate derivations of American creed rooted in history and 
cultural development is described by M. Foley, American Credo: A Field Guide to the Place of Ideas in US 
Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007.
47 A. Bloom, Introduction [in:] idem, Confronting the Constitution: Th e Challenge to Locke, Mon-
tesquieu, Jeff erson, and the Federalists from Utilitarianism, Historicism, Marxism, Freudianism, Pragma-
tism, Existentialism..., Th e AEI Press, Washington, D.C. 1990, p. 1–2.
48 In the twentieth century Europe some left ist thinkers were fascinated by this practical democratic 
republicanism and liberty, considering such features as the necessary preconditions for socialism. For 
instance Antonio Gramsci believed that Americans had national ideology as their most defi ning feature 
of political egalitarian culture. He wrote in 1920, that for Italy to be socialist the Italians would have to be-
come fi rst like Americans socially and economically, the embodiment of bureaucratic, democratic society 
without the pre-capitalist past still to be found in Italy and other European societies. Karl Marx in Das Ka-
pital had America in mind when making comments that “the more developed country, the less developed 
image of its future it shows”. In his judgment the United States was in fact less exceptional, because other 
nations would follow suit, develop and “Americanize”. S.M. Lipset, American Exceptionalism..., p. 291–292. 
Marx was describing “liquid modernity”, something which Oliver Cromwell in a diff erent context had 
in mind, when he said that no one goes so far as someone who does not know what is his direction. See 
M. Berman, Wszystko, co stałe, rozpływa się w powietrzu. Rzecz o doświadczeniu nowoczesności, Universi-
tas, Kraków 2006.
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of the fi rst planter have better hearts and are more heavenly than their predecessors, they will 
doubtless greatly rejoice, and will say, ‘Th is is the generation whom the Lord hath blessed’”.49 
With this New World image and its universal potential, the American creed 
implicitly assumed an idea of the American empire, slowly becoming a secular, 
civil religion of a nation and an element of national identity. Republican ideology 
began to be based on virtues which were taken from the millenarian spirit of the 
puritan, Calvinist in origin ethical code, based on such values as ascetic approach 
to matter and life, resistance to libertarian license, responsibility in the eyes of God 
for fulfi lling the Covenant, fear of failure in this endeavor. Th ese ideas were at the 
back of the Founders’ project and are visible in Th e Federalists Papers, Washington’s 
Farewell Address or Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. Th is moral dimension rooted in 
Protestant religiosity, visible in the Declaration of Independence, provides a frame-
work of a consensus, which blends democratic liberal creed with religious mission 
realized in history by the “chosen people” of God. Th e democratic nation rooted 
in such ideas is equal in the eyes of God and has a common ethical frame of refer-
ence, having no other competition, neither from feudal Europe, nor institutional 
churches, or ideologies of modern times, like Jacobinism or Napoleonic empire 
building temptation. 
Unlike in France American nationalism is referring to individuals in a common 
enterprise, not nationalism as an extension of Rousseau’s General Will, a mythical 
idea of a nation where individuals participate as the faithful in a communion of a sec-
ular church, the nation as heritage, as history, as being French. Nation in America 
is the people with rights rooted in the transcendent idea of secularized Covenant, 
whose heritage is their future. Slowly these religious theological myths of the set-
tlers turned into an operational secular civil religion. Th is civil religion was of course 
Protestant in its imaginary, and became the only and the most important element 
uniting all diff erent denominations. Th e civil religion and the liberal, individualistic 
capitalism coupled with democratic, voluntary, grass roots participation at one point 
became one, making modern American ideology as a distinct reality. Th is ideology 
was religious, since America was chosen in history as a providential nation where 
denominational creeds, ethnicities, races do not count as having any right to promi-
nence. Th is ideology created a nation of believers on the historical march against 
oppression of the corrupted world. 
It is fashionable to think of America as a relatively late empire, not earlier than 
the beginning of the 20th century. But it was latent in the American psyche from 
the beginning. Already during the Constitutional Convention Benjamin Franklin 
remarked that “If a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without [God’s] notice, is it 
probable than an empire can rise without his aid?”. Not without coincidence, this was 
a motto which was put on a Christmas card of vice-president Dick Cheney in the 
aft ermath of the Iraq invasion in 2003. Jeff erson used a phrase “the empire of liberty” 
49 Th e Memoirs of Capt. Roger Clapp, written c. 1680, printed in 1731 in Boston, quoted in R. Wilkin-
son, Th e Pursuit..., p. 87. 
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in a context of slavery being the most horrible blemish on it. A theme of empire pro-
pelled by a distinctive ideology, has been a constant one in American history. 
Th is American ideological experiment was from the beginning a mélange of de-
mocracy, capitalism and Protestant, sectarian religiosity. Democracy gives everyone 
potential participation in national identity and is rooted in a grass root tradition of 
American Christianity. It has been a desire for equal participation in history even 
if always prone to populism, vulgarity and bickering. Capitalism was a desire to 
transform the world and an individualistic desire to better one’s lot, possible within 
the reach of each, an idea expressed so well by Hector Crevencour. But religion was 
crucial too, because religion, that is Christianity, put democracy and capitalism in 
a narrative frame, gave meaning to the individualistic political and economic eff orts, 
putting them into a wider context of covenantal America marching through history.
Th is marching was only conditionally triumphant. It was conditioned on harness-
ing one’s desires and reaching beyond the vanities of power. It had its dangers too, 
an urge for conformity and self contentment, and fi rst of all a danger of idolatry of 
identifying the real material vulgarity and popular mobocracy with the will of God. 
But through most of American history
“these three legs of democracy, capitalism, and religion accommodated one another and, at the 
same time, pushed hard against one another. Th ere is a temptation to call Protestant Christi-
anity the most accommodating religion ever known, but, again and again, the churches man-
aged to withstand the politics and the economics of the age. Indeed, what made them good 
at accommodation was also what made them good at opposition: In the multiplicity of their 
denominations, Protestantism could infl uence the nation in churchly ways without actually 
being a church-without being a single source religious authority constantly tempted to assume 
a central political and economic role”.50
Protestantism kept America eff ective and burning of desire to make itself true to 
itself, to the idea expressed in 1776 in the “Declaration of Independence”, but born 
in the primitive settings of the fi rst Protestant sects thinking of themselves as cho-
sen people of God with a task in the New World. Th is has remained so, despite the 
fact that this Protestant faith was converted to a secular faith of America as a nation 
dedicated to a “proposition” that “all men are equal and endowed by their Creator 
with inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”. Despite constant 
betrayals of this secular faith. Th e great American crusades have oft en began with the 
moral language of the Christian churches seething with indignation over a betrayal of 
the American promise, universal and commensurate with the biblical moral vision, 
but they soon translated this religious indignation into social and political programs 
of crusading reforms. Abolition of slavery, the women’s suff rage, the temperance 
struggle, the civil rights revolution
“every so oft en, there would explode from the churches a moral and prophetic demand on the 
nation. But looking back, we can now see that these showy campaigns were mostly a secondary 
50 J. Bottum, Th e Death of Protestant America: A Political Th eory of the Protestant Mainline, “First 
Th ings”, August/September 2008, p. 24.
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eff ect of religious’ infl uence on America. Each was a check written on a bank account fi lled by 
the ordinary practice and belief of the Protestant denominations. As it happens, the denomina-
tions were oft en engaged in what later generations would scorn as narrow, sectarian debates: 
infant baptism, the consequences of the fall, the saving signifi cance of good works, the real 
presence of the Eucharist, the role of bishops. And, yet, somehow, the more their concerns were 
narrow, the more their eff ect were broad. Perhaps precisely because they were aimed inward, 
the Protestant churches were able to radiate onward, giving a characteristic shape to the na-
tion: the centrality of families, the pattern of marriages and funerals, the vague but widespread 
patriotism, the strong localism, and the ongoing sense of some providential purpose at work in 
the existence of the United states”.51
Th is religious Protestant fi re provided an iron cultural backbone of spiritual resil-
ience organizing this democratic, individualistic, capitalist modern nation and giving 
it a safety valve, making it a profoundly creedal one, converting this ideology to the 
international context.
Th is American creed as a kind of secular faith fused with religious, Christian sen-
timents, was somehow codifi ed at the time of the I World War and politically applied. 
Th is development was prompted at the end of the nineteenth century, a transform-
ing time for American universalism in yet another way. American Protestantism, in 
all its diversity, began to decompose, infl uenced by the liberal Protestant European 
theology coming from German universities. It had to confront a question of a rela-
tionship between Christianity and modern culture, assaulted by the combined forces 
of science and biblical criticism. Th e preachers of the dominant, mainline Protes-
tant churches, as well as the reform rabbis in Judaism came to a conclusion that be-
cause reality around them was changing, Christianity was to change with it, as liberal 
thinkers Croly or Wilson thought the constitution was to be changing, becoming 
a “living constitution”. 
Trying, in their judgment, to save Christianity, liberal Protestantism put in its 
place, in fact, a modernist heresy, a new religion. It diff ered from the historic doc-
trine namely the essence of personal Deity, the Bible, the meaning of Christ and the 
identity of the community of faithful, that is the church. Christian God was going to 
be an immanent force in history, something like Hegelian spirit, rejecting the origi-
nal sin as a personal, ineradicable part of human existence and the idea of personal 
conversion. Th e original sin was defi ned as a consequence of historical process, the 
Christian equivalent of Rousseau’s removal of evil from nature into history. Now it 
was possible to correct it by human means, making history an arena of personal re-
demption.52 A secular version of this liberal Protestantism became a basis of its hope 
for a redemption of the world from evil through a location of its sources entirely in 
history and social structure, a transformation of which was to bring equal and just 
society, both domestically and internationally. 
Internationally such an approach was visible on a grand scale at the time of the 
I World War, when progressive Christian leaders in America transformed them-
51 Ibidem.
52 See S. Gaustad (ed.), Religious Issues in American History, Harper & Row, New York 1968, p. 173–224.
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selves from principled pacifi sts to crusading interventionists, seeing themselves as 
evangelists for the New Gospel of democracy, international peace and ultimately for 
a redemption of the entire humanity. Th is messianism was represented symbolical-
ly by Woodrow Wilson’s crusade to “make the world safe for democracy”.53 Wilson 
grounded this feeling as part of American identity: 
“Sometimes, he remarked, people call me an idealist. Well, that is the way I know I am an Ame-
rican. America, my fellow citizens, I do not say it in disparagement of any other great people, 
America is the only idealist Nation in the world”.54
Domestically, this utopia became visible in a change of emphasis of the Protes-
tant churches from Christian orthodoxy to Christian charity, making Christianity 
relevant and applied in history, which was to became a vehicle of human redemp-
tion.55 Such an approach infl uenced the American and in general the Western social 
sciences aft er the II World War. Th ey became convinced step by step that human 
problems were possible to be solved by a proper application of progressive think-
ing and messianistic zeal of this secularized, heretical, protestant Christianity. It 
was this philosophy which gave birth to such messianistic liberal programs as “Th e 
War on Poverty”, “Th e Great Society” of the 60’s or the subsequent diff erent social 
policies planned and executed by the federal government. Th eir aim was a hubris of 
liquidation of poverty, as well as eventually human suff ering. Liberal Protestantism 
gave justifi cation to such secular radical reforms by providing “spiritual” support, 
resigning at the same time from a pretence of theological transcendentalism to 
judge the world. 
53 See R.M. Gamble, Th e War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of 
the Messianic Nation, ISI Books, Wilmington 2003, p. 89–110, 149–232.
54 W. Wilson, Idealistic, Speech, 8 September 1919 [in:] Ch. Ricks, W.L. Vance (eds.), Th e Faber Book..., 
p. 249. To which several years later G.K. Chesterton seemed to respond “Th ere is nothing wrong with 
Americans, except their ideals. Th e real America is all right; it is the ideal America which is all wrong”, 
“New York Times”, 1 February 1931 [in:] ibidem, p. 153.
55 R.M. Gamble, Th e War..., p. 49–68. Th ere are some authors who do not engage in any subtleties and 
call this prophetic stance a classical case of crude, “exclusionary nationalism”,based on messianic religios-
ity, rampant individualism, and violent militarism, which justifi ed wars of excessive cruelty against en-
emies perceived and branded as simply evil, whether they were Indians, Southerners, Japanese, Germans, 
or Muslims. In such a picture such presidents as Andrew Jackson, James K. Polk, and William McKinley 
were simply “war criminals”, and even Abraham Lincoln was just only a little more humane because of 
his authorization of Ulysses S. Grant’s strategy and William T. Sherman’s scorch earth tactics in Georgia 
during the Civil War. F.D. Roosevelt with his bombing raids, Truman’s Hiroshima and Nagasaki decisions 
were as pure nationalistic drives to get hegemony over the world, as was George W. Bush’s “war on terror”, 
which is nothing less but the dream of “soft ly fascist America” with neoconservatives being simply the 
equivalents of the Islamist ideologist Said Qutb, who do not only seek to “neutralize” their opponents but 
try to exterminate them. Such an approach was a long staple of the most radical left  as for instance is the 
case with the books of Noam Chomsky and many anti-American pamphleteers in Europe. But recently 
this simplistic view entered the academic mainstream, to mention just Patrice Higonnet’s book Attendant 
Cruelties: Nation and Nationalism in American History, Other Press, New York 2007. Higonnet thinks that 
the only hope lies in rejecting this half-backed nationalism concocted of religious messianism and violent 
militarism, and recovering “progressive America”, forming a strong link with “forward-minded Europe”.
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Th is evolution led liberal Protestantism to a position of being just a tool of liberal 
reforms causing splits in all the churches.56 One of the dangers of such an immanently 
understood redemption of Christ through historical process, the American protes-
tant equivalent of heglism, was a tendency to treat government and the state as an 
instrument of transforming reality in conjunction with God’s plan. Th at way, liberal 
Protestantism made Christianity an applied religion making it a tool diff erent from 
evangelical purpose which was eschatological only in a perspective of individual re-
demption. Th is change had another pernicious consequence of considering any re-
sistance to the liberal progressive aims of Christianity, as automatically beyond a pale 
of legitimate social behavior. Christianity was going to be either social charity similar 
to the aims of the liberal state and subject in terms of its doctrinal content to intense 
privatization, commensurate with any other beliefs like for instance magic, or noth-
ing. A rebellion against such a prescribed role for Christianity and religion in general 
was treated with alarm by liberals as a breach of the I Amendment. 
Th e religious “naked public square” was to be a goal sought and achieved. A thera-
peutic welfare state with aims commensurate with the progressive liberal philosophy 
was to be its religion, extremely jealous of any competition.57 But for the fi rst time 
such a liberal program was to be universally applied. It eventually established a new 
understanding of American exceptionalism against the world in need of conversion 
to democracy. Liberal messainism of this new sort was gradually anti-American, 
meaning statist and monistic, resembling the European Enlightment hope which the 
European Union seized on. No wonder that such a liberal, progressive messianism 
using a state to achieve its goals is greeted not only with alacrity among the European 
intellectuals, hoping for a fi nal transformation of America against its individualis-
tic, anti-statist culture, the hope expected and partially gotten from Barack Obama. 
Such messianistic, progressive liberalism is being slowly defi ned as the ideology of 
the world, bringing forth a utopia of the world government operated by transnational 
progressive elites of Europe and America, allegedly implementing the universal hu-
man rights against, recalcitrant Americans clinging to their obsolete and in fact not 
universalistic but particular and dangerous traditional messianism.
In America this coupling of Christianity with progressive liberalism, a subsequent 
emasculation of its orthodoxy and an alliance with the secular liberal progressive 
intelligentsia has not entirely established itself as an alternative cultural code of the 
post-traditional creedal America. A rebellion of evangelical and conservative mass 
religiosity since the 70’s, essentially a purely defensive reaction, testifi ed to that. Po-
litical movement as the Reagan or the Tea Parties revolutions of the 1980’s and 2009 
were of the same order. Th is monopolization of the American Creed by the secu-
56 See J. Budziszewski, Four Shapers of Evangelical Political Th ought [in:] idem, Evangelicals in the Pub-
lic Square, Baker Academic, Grand Rapids, MI 2006, p. 91–92.
57 See on that R.J. Neuhaus, Th e Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America, William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, MI 1984; P.M. Garry, Th e Cultural Hostility to Religion, 
“Th e Modern Age”, Spring 2005, p. 121–131; R.P. Kraynak, Christian Faith and Modern Democracy: God 
and Politics in the Fallen World, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN 2001, p. 1–44.
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lar, progressive, liberal monism has not overwhelmingly succeeded, although with 
the Obama presidency the jury in this case is still out. In Europe it has, making the 
mission of the United Europe expressed in purely secular, antireligious terms a pos-
sibility.58 Nevertheless, one may say that this religious dimension enables us to look 
closer at the American creed, which although rooted originally in the universal En-
lightenment ideas does not resemble universalism of the European, continental En-
lightenment. Th e political projects rooted in the Enlightenment in which the United 
States and the European Union have their origins, were not the same, the fact which 
accounts for their striking diff erences and misunderstandings.
Puritan sources of American modern identity 
of a “chosen nation” as a universal project of humanity
America, with all its harking back to Puritan origins, to the concept of sin and Prov-
idence, was a profoundly modern nation, because it was probably the fi rst nation 
which grounded its identity in providential religion and at the same time universal 
idea of common humanity, both defi ned by progress in history and not tied to social, 
political and traditional cultural bearings. In this sense America was a self-conscious 
nation, with its basic cultural ingredient, an injunction to recreate itself anew, to make 
its consciousness truly “fl uid”, free from the chains of history but not “fl uid” and free 
from the chains of biblical morality. It was to be an extremely modern and extremely 
moral nation at the same time. America had no chains to the past
“there [was] no shadow, no antiquity, no mystery, no picturesque and gloomy wrong, nor any-
thing but a commonplace prosperity in broad and simple delight one might enumerate the 
items of high civilization, as it exists in other countries, which are absent from the texture of 
American life, until it should become a wonder to know what was left . No state, in the Euro-
pean sense of the word, and indeed barely a specifi c national name. No sovereign, no court, no 
personal loyalty, no aristocracy, no church, no clergy, no army, no diplomatic service, no coun-
try gentlemen, no palaces, no castles, no manors, nor old country – houses, nor parsonages, 
no thatched cottages nor ivied ruins, no cathedrals, nor abbeys, nor little Norman churches; 
no great Universities nor public schools – no Oxford, nor Eton, nor Harrow; no literature, no 
novels, no museums, no pictures, no political society, no sporting class- no Epsom nor Ascot 
(...) such list as that might be drawn up of the absent things in American life, [in other words] 
what prevails, what sets the tune, is the American scale of gain, more magnifi cent than any 
other, and the fact that the whole assumption, the whole theory of life, is that of the Individual’s 
Participation In It”, 
that is pure potentiality.59
58 See J.J. Weiler, Chrześcijańska Europa: Konstytucyjny imperializm czy wielokulturowość?, W drodze, 
Kraków 2003; G. Weigel, Th e Cube and the Cathedral: Europe, America, and Politics without God, Basic 
Books, New York 2005, p. 72–77.
59 H. James, Th e Negative Side of the Spectacle and Th e American Scale of Gain [in:] Ch. Ricks, 
W.L.Vance (eds.), Th e Faber Book..., p. 294–295, 358.
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Walt Whitman, was this fi rst truly American poet of fl uid modernity and poten-
tiality. He was born before America became obsessively self-conscious, and as Ezra 
Pound wrote in 1911–1913, when America “was proud of a few deeds and of a few 
principles [when] the nation had no interest in seeing its face in the glass”. Whitman 
wrote in 1856 in Leaves of Grass about millions coming to America: “We plant you 
permanently within us, there is perfection in you. You furnish your parts towards 
eternity, Great or small, you furnish your parts towards the soul”. In Democratic Vis-
tas of 1871 this fl uid potentiality of self-creation was strikingly vivid: 
“Sole among nationalities, these states have assumed the task to put into forms of lasting power 
and practicality, on areas of amplitude rivaling the operations of the psychical cosmos, the 
moral political speculations of ages, long deferred, the democratic republican principle, and 
the theory of development and perfection by voluntary standards, and self-reliance. Who else, 
indeed, except the United States, in history, so far, have accepted in unwitting faith, and, as we 
now see, stand, act upon, and go security for, these things”. 
For Whitman America was commensurate with history and eternity at the same 
time, with hope for mankind and with this mankind’s desire for universal love. In 
his poem America of 1888 from Leaves of Grass he wrote “Centre of equal daughters, 
equal sons (...) Strong, ample, fair, enduring, capable, rich, Perennial with the Earth, 
with Freedom, Law and Love, Chair’d the adamant of Time”.60 
For Whitman the religious impulse of being “chosen” was secularized into this 
profound potenciality of creating new civilization ab ovo by consciousness without 
restraints of the past, directed only by democratic equality and anarchical freedom 
as closest to human essence, thus closest to nature, whether religiously or othervise 
interpreted. America was thus the future of the world since it had been able to shed 
the shackles of artifi cial obstacles, mental as well as material, setting by its own will 
in freedom its future course for itself and the world. Modernity was thus in America 
from the beginning perceived by the Europeans as profoundly destabilizing and at 
the same messianistic impulse, anachronistically tied to religious roots, however sec-
ularized. It was modern, because it destroyed all the traditional ties, it was conserva-
tive because this modern, fl uid consciousness was nevertheless tied to biblical moral-
ity, even if that biblical morality was converted into historical mission of recovering 
true humanity, thus humanity as demanded by God commensurate with true nature. 
Actuality and potentiality, the fi nal overcoming of alienation was within the grasp 
of Americans. Th is transformation of biblical eschatological impulse into historical 
actuality, was the most striking heresy coming from Protestant American culture and 
infecting both the churches, the secular intellectuals, soon to be aided by nascent and 
anti-Christian psychotherapeutic movement, providing individual salvation within 
the social context. 
Th e European traditional conservatives looked thus at America with horror as 
a civilization of vulgarity and fl uidity and its religion as nothing more but an egotisti-
60 Ch. Ricks, W.L. Vance (eds.), Th e Faber Book..., p. 67, 179, 187, quotation of Pound from Patria Mia 
[in:] ibidem, p. 278.
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cal expression of the Protestant religious individualism gone mad, tied to this sense of 
unlimited possibilities of the human character and intellect prone to heretical mad-
ness of binding history to biblical eschatology. In turn, the European progressives 
and liberals of all pedigrees, looked at America with horror because it tied, culturally, 
and practically en mase this modern progressive spirit to a religious background and 
individualism at the same time, the former not allowing progress to be decoupled 
from any religiosity a la post-Enlightenment Western Europe, the latter looking with 
horror at any idea of collectivism. Here lie the roots of this absolutely inconceivable 
alliance in any other sphere, of the European conservatives and progressives on the 
basis of one of the most universal and highly original ideological products of the Eu-
ropean mind, its latent and sometimes virulent anti-Americanism. 
Th e most visible instance of this impulse to challenge contemporary America 
in the name of the glorious ideas of its founding, of coupling history with religious 
promise, was the famous oratory in fact a sermon by the Baptist preacher and the 
main leader of the Civil Rights movement since the 50’s, Martin Luther King “I have 
a dream”. King delivered it at the civil rights rally in Washington in 1963, combining 
a language of republican democracy with respectable metaphors of business fi nance, 
stating that “Th e architects of our republic’ had signed ‘a promissory note (...) of life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness to which every American was to fall heir’. America 
had ‘defaulted on this promissory note’; it had ‘given the Negro people a bad check”.61 
Calling for justice King challenged Americans, white Americans, to look back and 
to march to the just future so to make America a ‘great nation’ true to its universal 
principles of justice, to transform its jangling discords into a “beautiful symphony of 
brotherhood”. In this way King invoked the nation’s ideas but also fears, and calling 
from the black injustice pleaded America not to be afraid, since it could accommo-
date justice to the blacks within the larger framework of American Promise, essen-
tially biblical universal promise, without diminishing itself but, to the contrary, with 
a chance of elevating itself. Th e nation should not, argued King, be afraid of falling 
apart because of the racial strife and resentment. He connected this fear of falling apart 
with the alleged inability to rise up and live out the full meaning of its “creed”, of the 
Declaration of Independence: 
“I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, every hill and mountain shall be 
made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the crooked places will be made straight, 
and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all fl esh shall see it together (...) From every 
mountainside, let freedom ring”.
Towards the end of his speech the King referred to nature-fi rst in biblical idiom and 
then the language closer to that used by presidential candidates, invoking the range 
and majesty of the American continent. From “the snow-capped Rockies of Colorado’ 
to lookout Mountain of Tennessee”, he summoned a geographical ‘E Pluribus Unum’.62
61 A. Meier et al. (eds.), Black Protest Th ought in the Twentieth Century, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis 
1971, p. 346–351. 
62 Ibidem.
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At the center of this American fear of a profound loss of its creedal promise is at 
the same time a “state of nature”: 
“a nourishing, stabilizing essential for all future growth. Th e central fear is that of failing away, 
but the others are involved also. To lose naturalness is to lose a source of vigor as well as vir-
tue; and the artifi ce that controls and manipulates people may also sunder natural ties. Th e 
Puritan settlers, it is true were ambivalent to nature. If sin, in their eyes, oft en came through 
the vices of unnatural living, it also came through natural pride, which should be curbed at an 
early age. Looking outward too, the colonial Puritans, and indeed many nineteenth-century 
settlers, viewed the wilderness as a place of desolation and degeneracy, to be resisted or con-
quered rather than embraced. Yet the colonial America also bequeathed to the Revolution and 
the early Republic an idea of the New World as a preserve of benign liberty, innocent of the 
artifi cial corruptions and oppressions of Europe. Nature’s gentleman, a plain living, plain deal-
ing homesteader, unaff ected by fancy ranks and hierarchies, became an American ideal. As 
it traveled through the nineteenth century, the ideal remained essentially pastoral, but it was 
quickened by the more assertive qualities associated with frontiersmen”.63 
In that sense the original seventeenth century Protestant, mainly Puritan reli-
gious experience paved the way for a distinctively American, modern Gnostic heresy, 
a unique transformation of Christianity and its immanence in history, without at the 
same time converting Christianity to a secular project inimical to it, like for instance 
in the European modernity. Th e seventeenth-century “Puritan ‘lust for massively 
possessive experience’, an un-Christian libido dominandi for achieving existential se-
curity by drawing transcendence into immanence to transform all experience into 
proofs of divine election” gave the American political culture an extremely messian-
istic trait. Th is messianistic, established cultural code is reverberating in America till 
today, which shows itself in situations of great danger, when the politicians, as in the 
aft ermath of 9/11 2001 attack went back again, even if subconsciously, to the narra-
tive and language of the Puritans. 
Th is language is prophetic, reminiscent of sermons ringing through American 
history and at the same time in the best tradition of American Puritan jeremiads, 
it laments over lost, betrayed Covenant. Puritans believed that America was unique 
not because it was exclusivist, nationalist in the modern sense of the word, that the 
Americans were right by the very fact of being Americans. It was unique because it 
tried to establish something unprecedented, a community of people, a new nation 
in a sense of it being called up to a standard of a universal right. Winthrop’s City 
upon a Hill was not meant to be a boastful comment of moral self-righteousness or 
self-conceit, where America was a beacon to the entire world by the mere fact of it’s 
existence, but more as a warning that Americans have to live up to certain standards 
because “the eyes of all people are upon us (...) we shall shame the faces of many of 
God’s worthy servants and cause their prayers to be turned into curses upon us till we 
be consumed out of this good land wither we are going”.64 
63 R. Wilkinson, Th e Pursuit..., p. 79–83. 
64 J. Winthrop, City upon a Hill [in:] D.J. Boorstin (ed.), An American Primer, op.cit., p. 26–41.
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Th e Puritan American sense of nationhood had nothing to do with aggressive 
nationalism. Patriotism of the New World was not tainted by any connection to the 
German Blut und Boden, nor was it compromised by a promethean ideology of the 
French Revolution, which made history and progress through history the only scene 
of this destructive fury to remold the entire world against reality, religion, culture, 
and on its ruins to form a new civilization concocted out of the abstract wander-
ings of the intellectuals. Th e Puritan American patriotism, its messianism, was a very 
dynamic combination of political liberty and Judeo-Christian sense of limitations 
of human character, which together were going to make history a real drama of the 
moral, incremental individual improvement, something contrary to a political, to-
talitarian project.65 Such Puritanism had an enormous appeal to all groups who came 
to America aft erwards, who initially were despised and treated with disdain by the 
original WASP elites, but soon accepted its premise as its creedal passion, blending 
their cultural identity and the American identity at the same time. 
Th ere was something in the Puritan thought which enabled anyone to be part 
and parcel of this millenarian project which recognized frailties of the human char-
acter and spirit, and at the same time made it a starting point of transformation 
through a unique political and social system. For instance, Anti-Catholicism was 
for a long time a commonly held prejudice of the protestant population, till today 
it is in fact “the last respectable prejudice” of some intellectual liberal left  circles, 
the “anti-Semitism of the intellectuals”.66 Th e same applied to anti-Semitism or racial 
prejudice, the features of apparently Protestant “waspish” culture. But today there are 
exactly the Catholics and the Jews who have imbibed the American type patriotism. 
Together with the Evangelicals, historically the most vibrant and the largest branch 
of Protestantism’s anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism as the most despicable moral 
off ence, they form bridges to all of them in an eff ort to stave off  the most vicious at-
tacks against American creed. What happened, was simply that 
“America happened. Th e Puritan narrative was convincing enough to assimilate Catholic suc-
cessfully, and also fl exible enough to let them remain Catholics. Of all the transformations 
wrought by the alchemy of the Puritan paradigm – that was a combination of Judeo-Christia-
nity with old style liberalism”.67 
Th is old style liberalism, not to be confused with the modern type liberalism, of 
the imperial Self gave the American culture this absolute, practical trait immediately 
implemented in the New World through the constitutional system, the trait of indi-
vidual autocreation tied yet fi rmly to religious moorings. Th is combination of Judeo-
Christianity with old style liberalism, mainly in the political sphere, is the one that
“would have appeared most remarkable to 17th century forebears. And it’s a good illustration 
of the distinctiveness of the American style of assimilation. Th e typical immigrant Catholic 
65 See on that G. McKenna, Th e Puritan Origins of American Patriotism, Yale University Press, New 
Haven 2007.
66 In a memorable phrase of Pieter Viereck.
67 M. Potemra, A New Kind of Country, “National Review”, September 24, 2007, p. 60.
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adapted to the American way of life without ceasing to be Catholic; the typical native-born 
Protestant learned to let go of ancient hatreds without ceasing to be Protestant. Th e result was 
the enrichment of both traditions”.68 
Th e Catholic tradition got enriched, for instance, by reformulation of a traditional 
concept of church authority not in a doctrinal sense of the world, but in the tradition-
al European sense of clericalism. Th e Protestant tradition got enriched by the Catho-
lic stress on the Puritan, protestant tradition being reformulated in the lights of the 
Catholic natural law, which does not function prominently in Protestant thought.69
Such developments enabled to translate this American universal, Protestant creed 
into a rational language of engagement with the outside world as well, the staple of 
natural law tradition, at the same time staving off  the most rabid attacks on religion 
inside the US by the liberal left , as in fact un-American.70 It is also here, where Catho-
lics try to salvage American contemporary version of progressive liberalism from 
sliding into a subjective form of nihilism, where in the process of autocreation of the 
autonomous subject, the moral life of an individual is being reduced into a sheer act 
of will and power.71
Th is idea of the “chosen people” has always been tied in America to an idea of 
political and social revolution as a religious movement of redemption, the American 
Revolution being the fi rst. John Winthrop expressed this spirit of universal messian-
ism in his A Model of Christian Charity of 1630, the founding document of the Puri-
tan mentality, when he proclaimed that 
“We shall fi nd that God of Israel is among us, when ten of us will be able to resist a thousand of 
our enemies; when we shall make us a praise and glory that men shall say of succeeding planta-
tions, ‘Th e Lord make it likely that of New England’. For we must consider that we shall be as 
a City upon a Hill. Th e eyes of all people are upon us. So if we shall deal falsely with our God 
in this work we have undertaken, and so cause him to withdraw his present help from us, we 
shall be made a story and a by-word through the world. We shall open the mouths of enemies 
to speak evil of the ways of God and all professors for God’s sake. We shall shame the faces of 
many of God’s worthy servants, and cause their prayers to be turned into curses upon us till we 
be consumed out of the good land whither we are a-going”.72
Th e American universalism was rooted in the millenarian English thought of the 
16th century and it evolved into an idea of the United States as a country responsible 
for a world-wide redemption. For this, Americans as the “chosen people”, were given 
68 Ibidem, p. 61.
69 See J. Budziszewski (ed.), Evangelicals...
70 Th e most prominent of the Catholics who engaged in such a project was John Courtney Murray, SJ 
in the 50’s and 60’s. Th e most known of contemporary Catholics are the late Richard J. Neuhaus, Robert 
George or Russell Hittinger. See J.C. Murray, We Hold Th ese Truths: Catholic Refl ections on the American 
Proposition, Seed and Ward, New York 1960; R.J. Neuhaus, American Babylon, Basic Books, New York 
2008; R. George, In Defense of Natural Law, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2000; H. Arkes, Natural 
Rights and the Right to Choose, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002. 
71 Th is task, for instance, was taken up by Christopher Wolfe in his attempt to salvage liberalism by its 
connection to natural law. See idem, Natural Law Liberalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007.
72 D.J. Boorstin (ed.), An American Primer, p. 26–43.
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a new Promised Land. Th is promised land was both the Natural Paradise, a glimpse 
of how, before the fall, Paradise could look like, a confi rmation that God aft er all 
decided to give humanity a second chance. Th is time yet this was to be done in ac-
cordance with God’s will and a Covenant bound with these new people. Th e tree of 
knowledge of good and bad was there too, inside of every colonist’s soul, waging an 
incessant battle not to corrupt the promise, so the triumph of the God’s “chosen peo-
ple” would fulfi ll history. In this sense 
“the notions of a grandiose American destiny look rather like those of apocalyptic prophecies
-Hebraic predictions of the triumph of God’s people they are literally apocalyptic they were 
regarded as the continuation of the biblical prophesies themselves. Manifest Destiny has been 
described as a ‘nationalistic theology’ ”.73
Cotton Matter, observed in 1702, documenting what he defi ned as “Christ’s great 
deeds in America [that] religion brought forth prosperity, and the daughter destroyed 
the mother. Th ere is danger lest the enchantments of this world make them forget 
their errand into wilderness”.74
Th is social and moral self castigation, a literary mode of lamentation, this jer-
emiad present in the American thought and literature from the seventeenth century 
conveys not only this idea of the “chosen people”, but at the same time people who 
were fl awed morally and always on the verge of betrayal of the Covenant. Th is Cov-
enant was closely related to a mission, divine expressed oft en in Apocalyptic terms, 
enhanced by the pristine and absolutely stupendous nature reminiscent of Paradise. 
America has thus been a country with an underlying unease, of people who loudly 
proclaimed the Enlightenment at the beginning of their times, and yet trembled at 
the approaching millennium which would subject them to God’s wrath.
On the one hand Th e United States has been a country which has had an incessant 
string of religious or quasi religious revivals coupled with a sense of collective guilt 
and repentance, of which the civil rights revolution of the 50’s and 60’s, or evangelical 
Christianity of today seem to be the recent examples. Th ese revivals, seem to have 
been fi ghting with the irenic deism of American religiosity, of which the most tell-
ing example is the religiosity of the Founding Fathers. Th ey have usually been pious, 
restive, utopian and apocalyptic, burning with passion and earnestness. Such revivals 
rocked the country with millions converting in heady mass gatherings, where Meth-
odists, Baptists, Disciples of Christ evangelized aggressively and battled the estab-
lished Congregationalists, Presbyterians and Episcopalians with the new movements 
like Mormonism, Shakerism, Swedenborgianism, transcendentalisms, Universalism 
or Spiritualisms.
73 E. Lee Tuveson, Redeemer Nation: Th e Idea of America’s Millennial Role, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1976, p. 91; out of this ‘nationalistic theology’ could then be derived such further statements of 
Abraham Lincoln as “almost Chosen People” or Woodrow Wilson’s at the beginning of the 20th century 
that “America had the infi nite privilege of fulfi lling her destiny and saving the world”. See also A.K. Wein-
berg, Manifest Destiny, Quadrangle Books, Chicago 1963, p. 17.
74 Quoted in P. Johnson, Th e Almost..., p. 16.
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On the other hand there has been among Americans a pragmatic, technological 
obsession of making reality subordinated to a rational scheme of working.75 Among 
the fi rst Puritan colonists there was an idea of imminent Millennium, this conviction 
that one thousand years of Christian fraternity stretched before them which needs to 
be used for concrete projects. For instance in the words of Edward Johnson, but not 
only to him, we fi nd that
“coupling of Genesis with Isaiah and Revelation, which leads to the proclamation that God’s 
chosen people were commissioned to subdue and improve the New Land (...) .Th e Puritans 
were convinced that God had called them to this task. Never did they view themselves as ex-
ploiters, but rather as blessed developers (...) the reform of the natural landscapes of America 
was thus no mere colonial obligation but God’s own imperative. It lay within the inexorable 
schedule of fi xed events in the calendar of scriptural prophecy (...) Th e Bible off ered the Puri-
tans doctrines imparting meaning to their colonizing eff orts (...) For the Puritans the emigra-
tion to America seemed (...) cosmically momentous, essentially because of their conception of 
history founded in Christian typology. Th e messianic Jesus of the New Testament had enabled 
Christian exegetes from the Church Fathers onward to the Puritans to fi nd a transcendent 
coherence in the Old and the New Testament. Th eir exegesis revealed a historic pattern which, 
in light of the prophecies in the books of Daniel, Isaiah and Revelation, subsumed the past 
and present and pointed forward to the Apocalypse. In the seventeenth century the Puritans 
thought the Apocalypse to be imminent. Using Christian typology, they found an ascending 
pattern of specifi c events that proved the imminent redemption of Israel, itself fi gurally the 
true church or chosen people. Accordingly eschatology, the study of the fi nal events in human 
history, was a major Puritan preoccupation. Just as Puritans had deduced a formula for the 
individuals experience of salvation from his eff ectual calling to his ultimate sanctifi cation in 
Christ, so did they discern an opposite, demonstrable pattern of events by which a communal 
Israel moved even closer toward redemption. In the cosmos each progressive step in the pat-
tern was markedly closer to the ultimate redemption of the Day of Judgment. Events of the 
Apocalypse comprised the fi nale of this pattern and Puritans believed them to be in Motion 
‘and to be happening right before their eyes in America. America was there no mere colonial 
obligation but God’s own imperative. It lay within the inexorable schedule of fi xed events in the 
calendar of scriptural prophecy (...) Th e Bible off ered the Puritans doctrines imparting mean-
ing to their colonizing eff orts”.76
Th is idea of the “chosen people” laboring under a yoke and blessing of Covenant 
runs deep in American history and constitutes the core of the American subcon-
scious. Jeff erson used it in a slightly diff erent context of pristine, paradise type of na-
ture, but nevertheless also exclusively possible to be applied only to America. Jeff er-
son, for whom nature and agrarianism was the source of republican virtue, considered 
America a unique place in this regard, the chosen land by reason of its unspoiled land: 
“Th ose who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God if ever he had chosen people, who-
se breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue. It is the focus in 
which he keeps alive that sacred fi re, which otherwise might escape from the face of the earth. 
75 See on this uneasy relationship D. Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: Th e Transformation of 
America, 1815–1848, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008.
76 C. Tichi, New World, New Earth. Environmental Reform in American Literature from the Puritans 
through Whitman, Yale University Press, New Haven 1979, p. 15–18.
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Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of which no age nor nation 
has furnished an example”.77
Jeff erson’s “chosen people” were the people of a particular class not a nation, but 
because as Crevencour noticed in his Observations of an American Farmer this class 
comprised in principle an entire nation, this idea of the “chosen people” was in fact 
tantamount to the experience of a particular, unique type of people, combining na-
ture, character, social structure and Covenant in one. America was favored by Provi-
dence because of its mores and an idea of liberty rooted in religious liberty, not nec-
essarily because it was designated by God to play a historical role, but it is diffi  cult to 
disentangle one from the other. Th us the “chosen people” engaged themselves into 
political and social revolutions as if these were religious movements. 
Th e American political revolutions follow the steps of the great religious awaken-
ings. Th e Revolution of 1775–1787 followed the First Great Awakening. It was just 
a military and political expression of a religious movement, and those who carried 
it through believed that they were fulfi lling God’s will thwarted by the British Parlia-
ment and the King. Th e Protestant clergy in their fi ery sermons was the most vocal 
group justifying and supporting it. Th e Declaration of Independence justifi ed it in the 
natural law language of the Biblical God who gave an inalienable right to life, liberty 
and a pursuit of happiness to everyone, within a political order chosen to secure these 
rights with a right of rebellion. Th is was combined with equity language and a referral 
to the common law tradition as a universal tradition of British subjects having rights 
which were coterminous with natural rights. Th e Great Awakening which began in 
the 1730’s provided the revolution with a spiritual and emotional energy. 
Religious ecumenicalism as a basis of the American civil religion 
and the world mission
Jonathan Edwards, the fi rst preacher of this Great Awakening believed fervently that 
“there was no real diff erence between a political and a religious emotion, both of 
which were God-directed. Th e right kind of politics were, to his way of thinking, no 
more than realized eschatology”.78 For Edwards 
“there was no reason why God should not ‘establish constitution’ within confi nes of which 
humans could cooperate with Him and all might have a knowledge that the hour was coming 
when God ‘shall take the kingdom. [For Edwards] the dawn of a glorious day was near and 
happily expected”.79 
77 Jeff erson Notes on the State of Virginia [in:] T. Jeff erson, Writings, ed. M.D. Peterson, Viking Press, 
New York 1984.
78 P. Johnson, Th e Almost..., p. 18. 
79 Quoted in Bercovitch, Th e Puritan Origins of the American Self, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1975, p. 152–163. 
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He introduced kind of religious ecumenicalism deft ly corresponding to this individ-
ualistic, democratic, Protestant approach to religion, dissolving creedal diff erences 
and being the basis of political democratic unity across the colonies, the real ethic of 
the American Revolution, the fi rst practical instance of the American civil religion, 
merging religious, social, political ideas into one common creed of distinctive beliefs 
and standards instinctively held and driving them to revolution. Edmund Burke dis-
cerned perceptively this energy and warned about British complacency in his speech 
in Parliament in 1775. 
Th is Christian, predominantly Protestant ethic, transforming doctrinal diff erenc-
es formed a glue of the civil religion of the new nation set for independence, impos-
sible to argue away. Such an ecumenic, across religions spirit, the sense of destiny of 
the covenantal people was captured from a hindsight by John Adams who wrote in 
1818: “Th e Revolution was eff ected before the war commenced. It was in the minds 
and hearts of the people; a change in their religious sentiments of their duties and 
obligations”. For Adams, this Protestant, biblically rooted religion of free people was 
the foundation of the American civil spirit: 
“One great advantage of the Christian religion is that it brings the great principle of the law of 
nature and nations, love your neighbor as yourself, and do to others as you would that others 
do to you, to the knowledge, belief and venerations of the whole people. Children, servants, 
women and men are all professors in the science of public as well as private morality (...) the 
duties and rights of the man and the citizen are thus taught from early infancy”.80
Th ere has been a long dispute in American history and historiography, in the 
latter case an enterprise partially partisan in the battle over the interpretation of 
the First Amendment, how religious the Founders were, or what was a real role of 
religion in public life at the beginning of the republic. But the issue of leadership’s 
beliefs is in fact irrelevant. Th e religious views of the Founders were hotly contested, 
some thinking that they were orthodox Christians, others exposed them as closet 
atheists, and still others dispatching them as deists. But whatever the religious views 
of the Founders, a conviction that a greater religiosity of the Founders would favor 
the establishment of religion or a dominance of one religious view is peculiar. Sepa-
ration of church and state was a conscious eff ort of the 18th century. Evangelicals 
and politicians experienced with whatever religious feud there was in the colonies. 
James Madison in his youth witnessed the harassment, imprisonment and vi-
olent abuse of Baptists in Virginia, for not being Anglican. Th is “diabolical, hell-
conceived principle of persecution” left  a deep impression on Madison and later 
during the draft ing of the Constitution he strongly opposed religious establishment, 
not because he wanted to enfeeble faith but because he wanted to fortify it. In 1785 
memorandum Madison wrote: “During almost fi ft een centuries the legal establish-
ment of Christianity has been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in 
all places, pride and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity, in 
both, superstition, bigotry and persecution”. Such argument appealed to evangeli-
80 P. Johnson, Th e Almost..., p. 19.
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cals of all sorts, like Baptists, but also to free thinkers like Jeff erson who famously 
remarked in defense of the right of conscience that “it does me no injury for my 
neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god”. If there was a real debate about 
religion it was not a question of its establishment, but a question to which extent it 
formed, any religion, a basis of republican virtue and morality, with Adams strongly 
in its favor, and Jeff erson paying lip service to it.
For this reason the United States was not created as a secular state. It could be 
more accurately described as a moral and ethical society founded on Christian be-
liefs, although without a state religion. Th e people who created it could be not par-
ticularly keen on religion as a ritual and doctrine, but were aware of an indispensable 
role of religion as fostering civic virtue. Th e “Declaration of Independence” in the 
fi rst paragraph invoked “the laws of nature and nature’s God” as a natural basis for 
independence of the American people since only then they could pursue life, liberty 
and happiness with which they were “endowed by their Creator”. It contained an ap-
peal to “the Supreme Judge of the world” and expressed their confi dence in “the pro-
tection of Divine Providence”. 
Th e United States was thus a political society, but formed within a religious, defi -
nitely Christian framework. Th e fi rst president George Washington commenced his 
fi rst inaugural with a prayer to “that Almighty Being, who rules over the universe, 
who presides in the council of nations”, asking God to bless a government consecrat-
ed “to the liberties and happiness of the people”. In addition Washington remarked 
that in “tendering this homage to the great Author of every public and private good” 
he expressed certitude that he was speaking on behalf of Congress as well, for 
“no people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible hand which conducts the aff a-
irs of men more than the people of the United States. Every step by which they have advanced 
to the character of an independent nation seems to have been distinguished by some token of 
providential agency”. 
In his Farewell Address of 1796 Washington wanted “Heaven [to] continue to you the 
choicest tokens of its effi  ciency. Religion and morality are indispensable supports [of] 
political prosperity [and the] mere politician [ought to] respect and cherish them”.
For him purely secular morality was not enough since “reason and experience 
both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious 
principle”. Without virtue and morality which were the “necessary spring of popular 
government”, a republic could not last. Th us no one who supported them could “look 
with indiff erence upon attempts to shake the foundations of the fabric [that is reli-
gion]”. In some other statements of the Founding Fathers virtue and public morality 
depended on religion, Christian and nondenominational to be sure, but religion as 
well. Even Jeff erson, an apparent deist, considered religion to be indispensable. Th e 
fi rst government under the constitution made the Federalists fi ercely denounce the 
Godless regime of revolutionary France. 
Lincoln, like Washington, saw God as the fi nal arbiter of public policy and his 
language was permeated by a characteristic blend of American public philosophy. On 
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the one hand it was a belief that there was a providential plan for America, and thus it 
had to be, for this reason, “the best last hope for the mankind”, on the other that this 
providential plan was to be connected with democracy and equality of rights. Th is 
belief in a sacral dimension of democracy as a framework of the providential plan 
was to be later secularized and given a purely idolatrous form in the writings of for 
instance Whitman, Dewey or the most contemporary Richard Rorty. For Lincoln, 
a democratic process was divinely inspired, and nowhere this showed more than in 
his First Inaugural Address of 1861 where Lincoln stated: 
“Why should there not be a patient confi dence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any 
better or equal hope in the world? If the Almighty Ruler of Nations, with his eternal truth and 
justice, be on your side of the North, or yours of the South, that truth and that justice will surely 
prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal of the American people intelligence, patriotism, 
Christianity, and a fi rm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken this favored land”. 
Th is could still solve, he claimed, “our present diffi  culty”. In his Emancipation 
Proclamation of 1863 while appealing to world opinion he also appealed to God for 
approval, and president George W. Bush praying for God’s inspiration had a good 
tradition behind him. Lincoln invoked “the considerate judgment of mankind and 
the gracious favor of Almighty God”. He told his cabinet that the Proclamation was 
infl uenced by what he considered to be divine intervention in the battle of Antietam 
and as Gideon Welles wrote in his diary 
“he remarked that he had made a vow – a Covenant – that if God gave us the victory in the ap-
proaching battle he would consider it an indication of the Divine will, and that it was his duty 
to move forward in the cause of the slaves. He was satisfi ed it was right – and confi rmed and 
strengthened in his action by the vow and its results”.81
Lincoln has been considered the archetypal American statesman, with an excep-
tion of the South of course, because there was in his thought, in his earnestness’ to 
infuse the American experience with a moral mission, and last but not least in his 
desire to make the natural law of moral equality of the “Declaration of Independ-
ence” applicable to the slaves, the real mediation of a special relationship between 
Christianity and politics, or in a more generic terms biblical religion and American 
democracy. In one of his comments he wrote
“Th e will of God prevails. In great contests each party claims to act in accordance with the will 
of God. Both may be, and one must be wrong. God cannot be for and against the same thing 
at the same time. In the present Civil War it is quite possible that God’s purpose is something 
diff erent from the purpose of either party; and yet the human instrumentalities, working just 
as they do, are of the best adaptation to eff ect His purpose. I am almost ready to say that this 
is probably true; that God wills this contest and wills that it should not end yet. By his mere 
great power on the minds of the now –contestants, he could have either saved or destroyed the 
Union without a human contest. Yet the contest began. And, having begun, he could give fi nal 
victory to either side any day. Yet the contest proceeds”.82 
81 Quoted in ibidem, p. 20. 
82 Ibidem.
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Again, in the Second Inaugural Address in 1864, at the time when the European 
elites were already to a large extend liberal and secularized to the core, in fact, rabidly 
anti-Christian and anti- religious, he spoke about “almost chosen people”. Th is was only 
possible because Lincoln knew that his countrymen would think in the same cultural 
and religious terms and feel with him this providential and tragic legacy and duty. 
Th e American Revolution and the Civil War, the foundational events of Ameri-
can history and identity till today, were thus infused with religious inspiration which 
determined its justifi cation. For this very reason the American cultural identity, like 
the Polish modern one, was intimately connected with the religious, biblical image 
of a special nation with a mission, and religion has been accorded a special place in 
the political process and public space, as an ingredient of civil religion, at the gov-
ernmental level as well as at the popular level. Biblical religion was justifying both 
the revolutionary quest for liberty and the quest for equality of rights, the engine of 
the American collective identity and justifi cation of its existence. Th is was strikingly 
visible in John Tucker who wrote in his election sermon in 1770–71, at the inception 
of the American republic:
“Th e fundamental laws, which are the basis of government, and form the political constitution 
of the state, which mark out and fi x the chief lines and boundaries between the authority of Rul-
ers, and the liberties and privileges of the people, are, and can be no other, in a free state, that 
what are mutually agreed upon and consented to. Whatever authority therefore the supreme 
power has, being the authority derived from the community, and granted by them, can be justly 
exercised, only within certain limits, and to a certain extent, according to agreement. To suppose 
otherwise would mean to act without a delegated power and constitutional right. Rulers may 
make laws, and appoint offi  cers for their execution and force them to the eff ect, i.e. according 
to their own arbitrary will and pleasure, but to do this would mean “to defeat the great design 
of civil government, and utterly to abolish it (...) [but] men (...) in the service of the public, con-
sidering themselves as accountable to God, as well to men. Th ey look beyond the present state 
of things, and view their conduct as connected with futurities of a most interesting nature; and 
will aim at approving themselves, not only to the people, but to their own minds, and to god 
the Judge of all. Such Rulers will best answer the great ends of their institution. In the last place 
then, [let us] take notice of the principles from which submission and obedience to government 
should fl ow. And these are, a sense of our duty to God, as well as to civil Authority, connected 
with and animated by a sense of liberty. True religion, A sacred reverence for the Deity: – the 
love of virtue and goodness, are as necessary to make good subjects, as good Rulers: and a spirit 
of liberty is requisite, to render obedience true and genuine both to God and man. Even the 
supreme Ruler of the world, is not despotic, arbitrary Monarch, nor does he require obedience 
by mere authority. His sacred laws, all framed agreeable to their perfect rectitude of this nature, 
and resulting from this infi nite goodness, and righteousness, are wisely adapted to the human 
system, and calculated for its good. Agreeable to the nature and tendency of these divine man-
dates, the obedience God requires of us, is not of slaves, to a tyrannical master. It must be free, 
a matter of choice, and not of force, driving us on against a reluctant mind”.83
Tucker then proceeds to extol the British Empire and the Constitution “founded in 
the law of God, and of nature; on the principles of reason and equity: a form of gov-
83 See the sermon in Ch.S. Hyneman, D.S. Lutz (eds.), American Political Writings during the Founding 
Era 1760–1805, Liberty Press, Indianapolis 1983, vol. I, p. 158–174.
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ernment admirably contrived for the due support of authority, and the security of the 
rights and privileges of the people”.84 
Th is nexus was a reason that the American presidents openly declared to seek in-
spiration of good judgment from God, and also prayed to realize his mission through 
American democracy inside and outside. Since Lincoln, this missionary zeal of mak-
ing America a nation in search of monsters to kill so the world would be more civi-
lized and moral has been visible in many American presidents, apparently in accord 
with the population at large. During the Spanish Civil War President McKinley at the 
gatherings of his co-religionists Methodists stated that he was “not ashamed” that he
“went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one 
night. And one night late it came to me this way. Th ere was nothing left  for us to do but to take 
them all and to educate the Philippinos and uplift  and civilize and Christianize them, and by 
God’s grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow men for whom Christ also died”.85
Th is was a striking statement where the universalist urge, imperialist in fact, was 
justifi ed by reference to religiosity and done so in sincerity. European imperialists 
would be afraid to utter such nonsense from their point of view, treating imperialistic 
endeavor if not in cynical terms, then at least in purely human, civilizational terms, 
being corrupted enough and self-conscious at the same time, not to mix orders which 
would cause derision of treating their public as half-wits.
Th e same mixture of religious and political missionary zeal was visible in 
Woodrow Wilson’s speeches. He was in fact the fi rst US president to play a large role 
on the international scene and his democratic missionary idealism was justifi ed in 
the “chosen nation” terms, coupled with religious justifi cation of “making the world 
safe for democracy”. J.M. Keynes during the Versaile Treaty proceedings was shocked 
that Wilson was not behaving like a politician at all, that is European politician, but 
a religious preacher instructing the fl ock: 
“Th e president was like a Nonconformist minister, perhaps a Presbyterian. [He] thundered 
commandments from the White House [and when in Europe] he could have preached a ser-
mon on any of them or have addressed a stately prayer to the Almighty for their fulfi llment, but 
he could not frame their concrete application to the actual state of Europe”.86 
Th e European observers have always been shocked by this most pervasive char-
acteristic of American politicians, the quasi, or even overt religious character of their 
rhetoric, irrespective of their particular faiths. Th e same was visible in a Puritan 
Calvin Coolidge, Catholic John Kennedy, men of the nondenominational Christian 
faiths like Herbert Hoover or Ronald Reagan, or Baptist Jimmy Carter. It was also 
expressed, as if knowing that America was inseparable from a religious sense of ex-
ceptionalism rooted in culture shared by the Americans, by such utter cynics like F.D. 
84 Ibidem.
85 P. Johnson, Th e Almost..., p. 20. 
86 Ibidem.
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Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson. Th e Biblical oratory was part and parcel of American 
political culture,and no presidency was immune to it. 
George W. Bush had the same rhetoric, and in his case it was coupled with a true 
Evangelican spirit of Bush’s personal conversion. Still before his second election he de-
clared that Jesus was the most important of philosophers adding that “I cannot imag-
ine being a president of our country without a relation with God”. Several months aft er 
the outbreak of the Iraqi war in 2003, Bush was allegedly telling the Palestinian politi-
cians that his decision to built a new Middle East was a task he received from God: 
“I came to you with a mission from God. God told me: ‘George, go and defeat terrorists in 
Afghanistan’. And I did this. And then God told me: ‘George defeat tyranny in Iraq’. And I did 
this. And now God came to me and told me: ‘Go and off er the Palestinians their own state, and 
security to the Israelis’. And with the help of God I want to do this”.87 
Such words were the direct consequence of a type of faith the president repre-
sented. Bush was a Methodist, but at the same time he belonged to the great current 
of Evangelicalism of which the most characteristic features are: the very personal 
contact with God, shown in a conviction that God talked personally to someone, 
the conversion in adult life, which is called ‘born again’ or ‘warming up of heart’, and 
a conviction that God has special tasks for the United States. Evangelicals belong 
to all churches, the conservative and liberal wings, although they are mainly in the 
conservative wing. Bush was the fi rst American president to be an adult convert to 
evangelicalism and as such his faith was both very personal and very seriously held, 
which showed in his activities against abortion license under “Roe v. Wade” of 1973, 
and stem-cell research and its federal funding. 
Th is religious rhetoric of the US politicians drives the European elites crazy, be-
cause their cultural code is strikingly diff erent, and references to religious imaginary 
seem to them immediately a threat to the liberal order. It was exactly against the re-
ligious establishment that modern liberalism and democracy were created in Europe 
and the European elites, strongly secularized, consider references to religion, let alone 
justifi cation of any policy by it, as a threat to the very essence of liberal democracy. 
But in America a political culture is strongly religious for a similar reason. Th e politi-
cal process and the religious establishment have never been thought to be in confl ict 
there. To the contrary they strengthened each other. It was out of the religious im-
pulse of the First Awakening that the Revolution of 1775 got spiritual strength, and 
out of the Second Awakening that the anti-slavery crusade followed. Th is harmony 
of religion and liberty in the United States was of course caused by multiplicity of 
establishments, or practical religious plurality and thus freedom, but also by a feeling 
that American experiment was unique and dependent on a special relationship with 
Providence, without which its predicament would be in danger. 
Religious, that is biblical, Christian Protestant mostly, cultural imaginary was 
thus, again, the very mainstay of American identity as a nation, and whoever of the 
politicians did not understand it, run the risk of being rejected. It is not, that this rev-
87 An interview in “Washington Times”, January 2005, aft er “Wprost”, 31 sierpień 2008, p. 87.
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erence for religion should be for a particular faith, let alone that a politician should 
be overtly religious, but the ritual of paying its due to this metaphysical dimension 
of American identity, not as a problem, but as richness, has been the mantra of every 
politician, otherwise running the risk of being cast aside. Aft er the 1968 revolution 
the liberal left  elites of the US have also been secularized the way the European elites 
have been. But every politician knows that you do not win elections by the elites vote. 
Th is harmony of religion and liberty, the very opposite of the European cast of 
mind, struck Alexis de Tocqueville
“In France I had always seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom pursuing courses 
diametrically opposed to each other; but in America I found that they were intimately united, 
and that they reigned in common over the same country. Religion was “the foremost of the 
political institutions” of America for many reasons. Not only for historical ones, but also for 
structural ones connected with the very essence of republican, democratic government in es-
sentially modern conditions fi rst created in American mass democratic society. Unlike in Eu-
rope republican government in America was built from bottom up, with the minimal use of 
authority and power of government and it stayed this way for a long time. Th ere was never any 
attempt to organize, in the European noblesse oblige style, the conduct of the society from top 
down. Th e question of social cohesion, of norms of individual behavior of the self-organized 
society stood at the centre of a society which could not rely on rules provided by the state 
authorities or religious monopolistic establishments. Republican democracy had thus to prod 
itself up by religious sanctions, voluntarily accepted as providing not only individual norms of 
behavior, but also providing, for historical reasons a sense of belonging to a nation which was 
one by the very fact of its choosiness and its special relationship with Providence of whose ac-
tual shape was individually, not collectively defi ned. Th e meaning of a generic Providence and 
God was provided from bottom up, every American could fi nd a way of this collective identity 
for himself, but the very nature of this collective identity was beyond doubt”.88
It was for this reason that president Dwight Eisenhower could utter his famous 
remark, which otherwise would be considered to be either a statement of an ignorant 
religious syncretic, relativist or a cynic, but which in fact was neither. His attitude 
was typical of the mid-20th century, as Lincoln’s was of the mid 19th century. Th is 
was the heyday of public Protestantism as a utility religion of American democracy, 
soon to be shattered by the coming counterculture. Eisenhower said “Our Govern-
ment makes no sense unless it is founded on a deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t 
care what it is”.89 Eisenhower was indiff erent to any creedal distinctions, but this had 
a deeper purpose, and refl ected somehow the nature of religious America, which has 
always been concerned more with moral conduct than dogma. 
It was not theology which was important, but a behavior of the faithful and a rec-
ognition of religious life for the well being of the republic. Here the diversity of diff er-
ent denominations fi ghting for the adherents guaranteed seriousness of faith of both 
the ministers and the faithful and eagerness to fulfi ll the obligations to God and the 
country. Th e meeting ground with the others was not dogma, but the common moral 
framework of biblical Christianity. For some this competition for the new souls mir-
88 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2000, p. 278–280.
89 P. Johnson, Th e Almost..., p. 18. 
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rored the competition in the market by diff erent fi rms, where a role of the state was 
minimal, just to ensure that the competition be fair. Th us the First Amendment did 
not make America a secular state and by the twentieth century 
“the American republic had come to rest on a tripod of forces: religion, democracy, and capital-
ism. All were mutually supportive; each would fall without the others. Indeed, any two would 
fall without the third. When Coolidge said that ‘the business of America is business he might 
equally well have added’ and the religion of America is religion. Th at was exactly what Eisen-
hower meant”.90
But in fact the Americans were the fi rst people of modernity, perceiving that 
there was no imposed and coherent offi  cial truth, and every purported truth was 
just an interpretation of an individual, also his relations to God. Th is meant a sub-
conscious agreement to live in a pluralistic world by default, in which interpretations 
confront and battle each other. Th is plurality of interpretations made the American 
framework the common denominator uniting them. Since this common denomina-
tor was successful, a thought that such a situation was the proper one because the 
Covenant worked could be entertained. Th is plurality ensured diversity of cultures, 
and guarded against hubris of thinking that you can institutionally impose the truth, 
in this case a religious dogma beyond mediations of many denominations reaching 
a compromise. Moreover this diversity was to express the essential features of human 
condition in modernity concerning one’s freedom. 
Th is religious diversity guaranteed thus freedom in a modern world of seeking 
one’s God through diff erent routes. But this diversity applied to other spheres of so-
cial life as well, giving it an unusual dynamic to change and invent itself by a constant 
comparisons and contrasts. Americans seek God through an individual search and 
are spiritually always on the move, neurotically trying to root themselves in anything 
stable. But in fact such a culture is restless, self-probing, in constant reformation. 
Only other’s gazes and opinions, limit the excesses of thought, relativize it, and im-
pose upon it its own critical gaze. Continual progress in the human world necessary 
passes through the acceptance of comparisons. Religious pluralism of America was 
one of the most striking condition of such modernity in operation, when my reli-
gious beliefs could coexist with my neighbors beliefs. For the fi rst time an individual’s 
meaning of life was derived not from a uniform culture, dogma or the state power, 
as in Europe. Th e individual had to choose it for himself with a realization that this 
is just one of many.91 
American religious pluralism ensured and explained why a growth of the state 
education system, at least until the second half of the 20th century never became 
a source of confl ict as in Europe, where it was pitted against the religious instruction, 
mainly Christian education. In America it was nonsectarian, but it was not nonre-
ligious. An author of this system Horace Mann made sure that religious instruction 
90 Ibidem, p. 21. 
91 Th is was the essence of Kant’s defense of diversity as a precondition of modern liberty in his utopian 
“Perpetual Peace”. 
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should be taken “to the extremist verge to which it can be carried, without invading 
those rights of conscience which are established by the laws of God, and guaranteed 
by the constitution of the state”.92 For this reason religious instruction in the public 
schools was focused on morality and character formation rooted in generalized Prot-
estantism. Th e dogmatic, religious content of the Protestant core was thus further 
diluted giving way to biblical cultural-religious frame, fi nally being converted into an 
ethical and moral consensus of Protestantism. It became the offi  cial spirituality of the 
American Republic, which then was certifi ed as an expression of the American Way 
of Life, the offi  cial philosophy of American civilization. 
Th is is true that this general Protestantism was contested fi ercely by Catholics and 
Jews, the former creating their own parochial schools so no to corrupt their religious 
teachings by the Protestant interpretations of the Bible. Th e Catholics have always 
had diffi  culties with this dilution of Christianity and its adoption as an offi  cial ideol-
ogy of the American republic as bordering on idolatry. In turn Protestant America 
looked at the Catholic Church in America through the lenses of a potential confl ict 
of loyalties. But in 1884, for the fi rst time a Catholic prelate Archbishop John Ireland 
of St. Paul declared 
“there is no confl ict between the Catholic Church and America, and when I assert, as I now 
solemnly do, that the principles of the church are in thorough harmony with the interests of the 
republic, I know in the depths of my soul that I speak the truth”.93
For immigrant Jews the issue of religious freedom was even more crucial since 
for them America, in between 1881–1914, became a promised land of opportunity. 
Th e overwhelming majority came from Eastern Europe, especially Russia and Aus-
tro-Hungarian Galicia and their primary motive of immigration was an escape from 
systemic discrimination and poverty. But what attracted Jews to America was not so 
much its liberal, secular regime, but freedom of religion, religiosity. Th is motive of 
religious freedom has been very much on the minds of the persecuted. America was 
neutral towards religion but in another way as for instance France was, which be-
came aft er 1870 a democratic liberal regime neutral towards religious denominations 
in a hostile way. America was neutral in a Tocquevillian sense as benevolently neutral, 
despite the cultural code of Protestantism. 
But both the Catholics and the Jews, culturally separated from the dominant Prot-
estantism recognized nevertheless America as a unique country where their prac-
tices, despite occasional discrimination, were tolerated and eventually respected. Th is 
respect could be discerned from the beginning of the republic, and George Washing-
ton’s letter to the Newport Jewish congregation was a proof of that. Th e secular Jewish 
intellectuals challenged this Protestant Christian orthodoxy by contributing mightily 
to the rise of psychotherapy at the turn of the 20th century. But both the Jews and 
the Catholics were included into the very mainstream of Protestant Christianity by 
a somewhat artifi cially construed concept of Judeo-Christian civilization in the years 
92 P. Johnson, Th e Almost..., p. 21.
93 P. Allitt, Religion in America since 1945: A History, Columbia University Press, New York 2003. 
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aft er the Second World War. For the Catholics it was only John Courtney Murray in 
the 1950’s who provided the doctrinal and political philosophy reasons why it was 
so, via natural law of the Declaration of Independence. Th is bond of Catholics with 
America was certifi ed in the 1970’s and 1980’s, when millions of Catholics persecuted 
in Indochina found refuge there. All of the faiths also recognize, that America was 
and is the only world power which signifi cantly makes the religious freedom issue 
one of the most important elements of its human rights policy. Th is includes also 
blocking of policies of diff erent liberal-left  lobbies which try to capture the human 
rights policy also against the religious freedom. In this sense America could not be 
described as a secular state but a land of religious exceptionalism. 
Religious revival, the fear of liberal monism 
and the public square in America
Th is importance of the religious impulse in American public life, present from the 
beginning has had consequences. Religious argument is not considered to be an odd-
ity in public, the case to be considered an oddity if not an outward reactionary stance 
in Europe. Th at is true, that with the New Humanism of the beginning of the 20th 
century, Protestantism lost power of argument, apart from its cultural presence. Also 
the liberal-left  counterculture of the 1960’s has changed the cultural code of America 
substantially. Nevertheless the revival of Catholic natural law language of the last 30 
years as well as evangelical’s political revival, both revolts against liberal Christianity 
accepting the terms of debate of the cultural liberal-left , make this public presence of 
religion still fairly well maintained. 
Of course, religion has also had in American history not only unifying potential, 
kind of a cultural code gluing American republic and democracy, as Tocqueville de-
scribed it. It has been oft en at the same time a force of disruption, even if “creative 
destruction”. Th e Revolution was inspired by the fi rst Great Awakening but it divided 
the colonial society, with a quarter of loyalists emigrating to Canada. Th e Second 
Great awakening aroused a nation against slavery. It abolished it but with the Civil 
War as a price, which nearly destroyed the Union and made the resentment between 
the South and the North a part of the American cultural code. Th e Th ird Great Re-
ligious Awakening of 1875–1914 resulted with a misbegotten attempt to introduce 
prohibition, the most overt attempt in America in moral social engineering, pitting 
Americans Catholics against Protestants, natives against immigrants and the provin-
cial America against the urban one. One could say that the Fourth Great Awakening 
preceded the Civil Rights revolution of the 50’s, in a sense that it was a religious in-
spiration of the Southern Baptists with M.L. King. During the last couple of decades 
we have had the Fift h Great Awakening which has also become divisive, but it shows 
the American religious exceptionalism today with great force, as a vivid presence in 
the public, legitimate arguments.
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In the U.S. church affi  liation was 43% in 1910 and stayed like that in 1920. But it 
was 49% in 1940 and rising to 55% in 1950 and 69% in 1960, a decade later falling 
to 62.4%. Th is relative decline corresponded yet to a split of American Christianity 
into two wings. Th e liberal one which comprises the mainline Protestant churches in 
relative decline, as well as the liberal wing of the Catholics and the Jews, and the con-
servative religious wing, comprising mainly Protestant evangelicals and “born again”, 
but also the conservative Catholics as well as the Jews. Suddenly in the 1970’s, religion 
began to break out in all places in the public square. Its reality was yet diff erent, char-
acterized by a great split in American religiosity into two wings increasingly hostile. 
It was a split between the old understanding of religion as being able to accommodate 
to modernity and the new stage of the liberal regime to the mutual advantage of both, 
and the new understanding of a mutual feud between an aggressive secular liberal-
left , post 60’s state, and allied with them by default liberal denominations, and an 
increasingly besieged religious conservative denominations which refused to play the 
role of domesticated and psychotherapeutic departments of the liberal welfare state. 
Th e split cut through the Protestant, Catholic and Judaistic faiths and has become 
the major factor of contemporary religious life in the United States. A defense of or-
thodoxy and its right to be expressed in public brought together conservative wings 
from the so far rather distrustful towards each other faiths. Th ey came to a conclu-
sion that the new liberal regime gave them no other choice but to defend their turf 
in the name of freedom of religion. In wit, a liberal regime of pluralistic America of 
the I Amendment was to become a liberal regime of a monistic ideological type, in-
terpreting the I Amendment as a mandate to separate religion from the public square 
and consign it to the private, purely inconsequential sphere. A symbolic act of this 
resurgence came with an entrance into political life of the evangelicals and “born 
again” Christians of the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish variety, forming an alliance 
which became supportive of the conservative political movement. 
Th is alliance was branded, somehow imprecisely, the Religious Right. Th is con-
servative religious wing constitutes the Fift h Awakening and has had powerful politi-
cal consequences, like the rise of Ronald Reagan’s coalition against collectivism and 
counterculture of the 60’s and 70’s, especially concerning questions of public moral-
ity, abortion, church-state relations and the family issues. For the second time such 
a Great Awakening embraced a large number of Catholics, it appealed also to non-
practicing Christians and non-Christians like Jews, all who feel that the subversion 
of the Judeo-Christian ethics would subvert the morals that underlie the American 
republic. Evangelical Christians in all denominations constituted a major part of this 
coalition. 
Evangelicals have always been present in the United States since the colonial peri-
od. Baptists have been quintessential evangelicals. Evangelicals belong to all church-
es, they are both in the conservative and liberal wings. But today the Evangelicals 
belong mainly to conservative churches, because for them it was the personal conver-
sion which should be the foundation of faith and engagement in social and political 
life, not the change of the social structures. Th e reasoning went that if Jesus changed 
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personal life of people they could change society. Social activity was thus to be subor-
dinated to a personal ethic and prayer. For the social gospel Christians, who became 
liberal and modernists a Christian should fi rst of all focus on changing sinful social 
and economic structures, so they would be congruent with the ideas of God’s justice. 
Since the 60’s the liberal churches allayed themselves with the Democratic Party and 
since 1968, by default, accepted its program of liberal-left  issues like abortion, homo-
sexuals in priesthood, so called “homosexual marriages”, as well as issues of peace, 
sexual, feminist type equality, or radical cultural sexual inclusiveness. Th is liberal, 
modern social gospel stance clashed with a traditional civil religion of America sup-
ported by the mainline Protestant churches. 
Of course, civil religion was a peculiar form of Christian idolatry, with a confl u-
ence of honor, family, the nation, religion and the fl ag. Since the 70’s these civil re-
ligion values were purged from the mainline, liberal churches for the sake of liberal 
left  social gospel values. As a result the traditional believers, including evangelicals, 
drift ed away to the conservative Protestant churches, as well as began to organize 
inside the Catholic Church, both beginning to build bridges to the Jewish orthodox 
communities and the Orthodox Church with the majority of evangelicals, forming 
a coalition of Christian Right.
Th is phenomenon has no visible counterpart in Europe, except may be in Poland. 
But it shows that religion and politics are organically linked in America and mutually 
reinforcing. Just as 
“the strength of religion in America sustains and nurtures democracy, so the vigorous spirit 
of American democracy continually reinforces popular religion. Th us while America remains 
the world’ s most powerful and enthusiastic champion of democracy, it is likely to preserve its 
exceptional role as the citadel of voluntary religion”.94 
An inclination to consider America as another developed country moving towards 
secularism become untenable. Because of America, although not only because of it, 
a general theory of secularism collapsed. Th e enmity of secular intellectuals towards 
the Religious Right is as big as it is riddled with utter ignorance and contempt, the 
mockery of their presumed fascination with tolerance and recognition of the “other”. 
In their defi nition, the “other” somehow nearly always turns out to be someone like 
them. But the Religious Right constituted essentially a self defense mechanism. Th e 
religious people began to perceive secular culture as imposing its dogmas on them 
and their families, by, for instance, public education and administrative rules, erasing 
classical liberalism’s distinction between the public and the private. A message of the 
Religious Right was clear: “we understand that you hate us and would like to wipe us 
out. But you do not really expect us to cooperate with you”. 
As far as the intellectual statements of the Religious Right were concerned these 
included, among many others, three declarations. Th e so called Hartford Appeal for 
Th eological Affi  rmation of 1975, the Evangelicals and Catholics Together of 1992 
with its follow up “Th at Th ey May Have Life” of 2006, and the “Dabru Nemet” [To 
94 P. Johnson, Th e Almost..., p. 22.
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Speak the Truth] of 2000, a statement of hundreds of Jewish scholars and rabbis deal-
ing with their relations with Christian America and Christian-Jewish past. In 1984 
Richard John Neuhaus published an infl uential book Th e Naked Public Square in 
which he pointed out a distorted way the First Amendment was interpreted both in 
the scholarly literature and the Supreme Court adjudication, as a mandate to push 
religious people and religious arguments from public square. He also put forth a rea-
soned argument for the legitimate presence of religious argument in the public space 
of a free, democratic society. Th e book caused enormous response but mobilized also 
the secular intellectuals fearing the conservative alliance between the orthodox wings 
of Protestantism, Catholicism as well as Judaism. 
Th e reaction of the Jewish community to the rise of the Christian Religious Right 
was especially nervous, since the Jews were escaping, in general, Christian intolerant 
societies of Europe, considered America to be a model of secular society in which the 
offi  cial religious code was kept in check and treated de-Christianization, in general, 
as part of blessed secularization in which they would feel safe, the Haskala myth of 
the Enlightened European Jewry of the 19th century. In the contemporary American 
context especially virulent and expressing such an approach has been the Anti Defa-
mation League leadership, for instance Abe Foxman who declared that the resur-
gence of religion in public posed a lethal threat to everything secularists cherished 
in America, and to the Jews in particular, taking into consideration what kind of 
emotions Christianity evoked in them. Joining forces with the traditional rigid secu-
larists, ADL in conjunction with ACLU, railed against the dangers of the Religious 
Right, insisting that religion meant simply privately held views.95 
Some secular Jewish intellectuals, with a certain portion of the religious Jewish 
establishment, are determined to caricaturize Christianity because in essence they 
view it, for historical reasons as a threat. For the secular Jews that enmity towards 
Christianity stems additionally from the fact that they are alienated from Judaism as 
such. Th ey gave up their religious particularity in order to be homogeneous liberals 
in the American “we”. Th ey expect the others to accommodate them by giving up 
their own religious particularity and resent it when the others don’t do it, thus be-
coming in their view at an instant intolerant, charging that the others are not behav-
ing like good liberals of their own kind. Th ere was a milder version of this approach, 
represented, for instance, by Michael Lerner of the liberal-left  TIKKUN magazine, 
who simply stated that religion in public was here to stay, since liberal democracy 
was having a defi cit of “politics of meaning”, but it was necessary to argue religion 
into accepting “progressive” ideology. Th is idea was not new, since that was exactly 
a course of liberal Protestantism since the turn of the 20 century. But it was exactly 
this Protestantism’s crisis which gave rise to the Religious Right, especially evangeli-
cal Protestantism. Lerner found some allies inside of the latter, for instance, Jim Wal-
lis who in his “God’s Politics” tried to built bridges to the Jewish religious liberal left , 
but it was not credible. 
95 See A. Sears, C. Osten (eds.), Th e ACLU vs. America, Bradman and Holman Publishers, Nashville, 
TN 2005, p. 123–171.
101Covenant, the Fear of Failure and Revivals as the Contemporary Sources...
Th ere was yet another response of Jewish, mainly, secular intellectuals, loosely 
connected with the neoconservative cultural and political movement, like Midge 
Decter or Irving Kristol. Th ey essentially understood Christian Religious Right’s as-
sertiveness as a defense mechanism, which forced it to mix religious activity with po-
litical and cultural issues. Moreover, they considered this activity as a blessed correc-
tive to the regnant, diff erent strands of secular liberalism. But they did not so much 
care about the content of Christian beliefs, as they stressed the social and political 
usefulness of the Christian Right beliefs. Th is mutual alliance between the Christian 
Right, especially its evangelical wing, and some of the Jewish intellectuals was aided 
by the fact that this evangelical Christianity was also overwhemingly supportive, for 
biblical reasons, the state of Israel. Some conservative Jews made yet an overt alliance 
with public Christianity, for instance Rabbi David Lapin and his movement Toward 
Tradition, or such thinkers as Michael Medved, Don Feder, Denis Praeger, or David 
Klinghofer who adamantly rejected an accusation of the liberal-left  Jewish commu-
nity, that they were simply the Jewish wing of the “Religious Right”. 
Of particulate importance in this context was a role of rabbi David Novak and 
hundreds of Jewish signers of “Dabru Nemet” declaration in 2000. Th ey were, in 
general, on the orthodox side of Judaism and the conservative moral, social as well 
as political issues, but their major concern was a relationship between Christian-
ity and Judaism in America, a new opening of the venerable, but for a long time 
stalemated “liberal” Christian-Jewish dialogue. A large group of conservative Jews 
professed their faith in the necessity of grounding a free and just society 
“in shared Jewish and Christians warrants. It is understood that, while there is not a shared 
Judeo-Christian religion, there is a shared Judeo-Christian ethic. In the long and troubled hi-
story of Jewish-Christian relations, this is an enterprise that goes deeply and could have the 
most lasting consequences”.96 
“Dabru Nemet” was also path-breaking in its unequivocal statement than Chris-
tianity had nothing to do with Nazism, the accusation which began to be recurrently 
repeated since the 80’s in some Jewish circles, making a continuous line between 
anti-Judaism of Christianity and anti-semitism of Hitler, implicating that there was 
an implicit, fundamental moral mistake in Christianity which resulted with the 
Holocaust. 
One of the fi rst on the Jewish side, who protested strongly against this slander 
was Milton Himmelfarb in an article No Hitler, no Holocaust of 1984.97 Not denying 
that Christian anti-Semitism was and is sometimes a reality, he compared criticiz-
ing Christianity with an implication of it being responsible for Holocaust as a vile 
tactics. Th is was so, since chastising what is left  of Christendom, even by some of 
the Christians now, has tended to be if not pro-neopagan then at least anti-anti-
neopagan. Himmelfarb pointed out, that for many American Jews the enemy was 
exclusively the religious Moral Majority, never mind that it was pro-Israeli and that 
96 R.J. Neuhaus, De-Christianizing America, “First Th ings”, June/July 2006, p. 56.
97 M. Himmelfarb, Jews and Gentiles, Encounter Books, New York 2007, p. 99–119.
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its morality was close to traditional Jewish morality. Liberal Jews thus provided an 
excuse for continuing to locate danger in Christianity especially the Christian Right, 
but missing was a realization that the common element in anti-Israel/anti-Jewish 
animus today had long been left ism, not Christianity, Christian left ists-and Jewish 
ones, the latter being fellow travelers of anti-Christian left ists, far more powerful and 
numerous. But the truth is that
“Hitler made the Holocaust because he wanted to make it. Anti-Semitism did not make him 
make it. Hitler was ex-Christian and anti-Christian. Hitler’s anti-Semitism was anti-Christian. 
Marxist anti-Semitism also is anti-Christian. Anti-Christian anti-Semitism descended ideo-
logically from pagan disdain for Judaism and the Jews. Jews now have more to fear from anti-
-Christians than from Christians, and from the Christian left  than from the Christian Right”.98 
Accusations of Christianity as a soul brother of the Holocaust, visible, for instance, 
in making Pius XII an ally of Hitler, whatever the former’s failings, has had of course 
much more to do with a contemporary hatred of the Catholic Church and Christi-
anity by the liberal-left . By making the Church implicit in the Holocaust it tries to 
delegitimize it morally in contemporary debates by an old method of criminalization 
by association, but this time in relation to moral issues which for the liberal-left  have 
become the icon of progressivism: abortion, euthanasia, sexual and marriage ethics.99
Th e mainline academic public intellectuals considered to be experts on things re-
ligious, were taken by surprise by this emergence of the Religious Right. One would 
not consider such public intellectuals to be serious, were it not for their seriousness 
about the subject matter. Th ere has been an annoying tendency on their part to pre-
tend to adjudicate in a canonical way what is real and proper and what is only ap-
parent and not real in Christianity, the latter being the faith of the overwhelming 
majority of Americans. From the beginning they seemed to disregard the basic fact 
as a starting point of their analysis, which is crucial to the understanding of the Re-
ligious Right, namely that it was an authentic, mass bottom-up movement, bound 
together by a legitimate sense of grievance. Such thinkers as Alan Wolfe, David 
Brooks, Harold Bloom, Stanley Fish or Adam Kirsch took diff erent approaches as 
they put forth the proper, in their judgment, role for Christianity, or in general reli-
gion in a liberal democratic society. For instance, for Kirsch the only possible “vision 
of faith is pragmatic, experimental, internal, more interested in love and forgiveness 
than judgment and punishment. More of this kind of faith, at least, can’t hurt the 
republic”.100 Th is amounted to a safety neutered Christianity. Alan Wolfe, a nonreli-
gious person and a sociologist of religion, analyzing the religious people in America 
in general concluded that Christians do not really believe what they say they believe. 
Th ey are despite what they say, in fact, good liberals, may be except homosexuality. 
98 Ibidem, p. 111, 115–116. 
99 On this fundamental antagonism between liberalism and Jewish tradition from the nineteenth cen-
tury to the present day see E. Alexander, Classical Liberalism and the Jewish Tradition, Transaction Books, 
New Brunswick 2005.
100 Quoted in R.J. Neuhaus, De-Christenizing..., p. 56.
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As far as the Religious Right is concerned he considers it to be extremist and hardly 
worth mentioning. What we have here is essentially an understanding of religion 
which seeks spirituality in service of the “self ”, kind of “I am religiously everything 
and therefore I am religiously nothing”, the voice of truly Emersonian Gnosticism. 
What we have in this approach is the non-Christians negotiating their place in 
a dominantly Christian society and their standing as experts on that society. Th is per-
tains especially to their religious expertise in that society. Taking into consideration 
that 85% of Americans consider themselves to be religious, this amounts essentially 
to a judgment that they live in a state of false consciousness by thinking that they 
are, in some way that really matters, Christians. An interesting case is provided here, 
by Stanley Fish, who argued that American Christians were not serious Christians 
because Christianity is a comprehensive account of reality and as such it is of ne-
cessity fanatical. And since Christians in America are not fanatical but tolerant and 
nice, except apparently the Religious Right, which must be so because of its apparent 
being un-American, it follows that these tolerant and nice Americans must be, an 
assumption also of Wolfe and Kirsch, good liberals. Such liberal Christians do not 
believe in the comprehensive account of reality, and thus, by implications are not re-
ally Christians at all. Th is way Fish as the others excluded the religious serious people 
from America.101 
Th e secular elite has been defi nitely surprised by the emergence in the last gen-
eration of the Religious Right, meaning the religious public opinion which does not 
share their liberal positions termed by them to be the essence of civilized politics. For 
this reason their apparent belief that secularization is a law of history was shattered, 
leaving them incapable of understanding that the public expression of religious views 
might be a legitimate way in which American democracy is exercising itself, engaging 
in issues of grave concerns for the citizens at large. Such issues which the standard 
liberal orthodoxy has considered to be decided once and for all, might be considered 
to be a particular instance of the hubris of intellectuals of the day. Th eir fl aw here is as 
charming as it is truly paranoid and hysterical and they are impervious to the facts of 
life and its inconvenient, from their orthodoxy point of view, consequences. 
Th eir overwhelming desire behind such a style is a fear of “theocracy”, that is the 
fear that religion would be imposed on others, and they search for marginal instances 
of such a behavior, so to corroborate their taken for granted thesis of danger which 
must be just around the corner. Th is constitutes of course a mirror image of their 
ideological bias, a projection on others what they themselves represent and which 
the religious people perceive as a real danger. Th is danger is simply an attempt by the 
liberal intellectuals and secularists to impose a rigid ideological monism on them and 
relegating them to the second-class citizens. But the alleged American “theocracy” is 
simply an ideological view how the modern American liberal democracy should le-
gitimately operate and what issues should be debated and which should be excluded 
from public debate. Such ideological limitations were exactly the ones which pro-
101 Ibidem.
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voked the religious people to enter politics in the fi rst place as a defense mechanism 
against the imposition of a radically diff erent secular “religion”. Th is secular “religion” 
which tries aggressively to change majority’s culture and morality. 
Th us the nature of this horrible, alleged “theocracy” stems, in fact, from a surpris-
ing realization on the part of the secular liberal intelligentsia, a fairly narrow group 
in America, that 
“a large number of Americans are actively engaged in democratically pressing for certain pub-
lic policies. Most importantly they argue that the unlimited abortion license imposed by [Roe 
v. Wade] is egregiously unjust and must be remedied. Th ey contend that same – sex marriage 
is a very bad idea that would do great damage to marriage and the family. Th ey believe that 
students in the classroom should be free to, even encouraged to raise questions about neo-Dar-
winist evolution. Some of them believe that the free exercise of religion should permit prayer in 
public schools. Th ese are political positions, which is to say they are positions pertinent to what 
their advocates believe is the just ordering of society. Political arguments should be engaged by 
political arguments within the bonds of civil discourse. Our constitutional order is in the serv-
ice of deliberation and decision about political positions through the process of representative 
democracy. Th ose who disagree with the above positions are of course also participating in that 
process. Nobody is trying to drum them out of the public square. When [secular intelligentsia] 
attempt to demonize those who disagree with them and deride their political opponents as 
‘theocrats’ and enemies of democracy, they are doing a profound disservice to the democracy 
that that they claim to be defending. Demonizing opponents is a tactic of desperation. Th e 
public infl uence of these people and of the platforms available to them makes it hard to under-
stand their apparent state of panic. Th ey do have arguments to make and are capable of making 
them. Robust and civil argument is to be warmly welcomed, whereas vulgar caricatures and 
name-calling are simply tedious”.102
Th e rise of the Religious Right and its entrance into a public sphere has been mis-
understood by the liberal progressive culture, because the latter does not understand 
its monistic and in fact totalitarian pretensions. Th e Christian Right of essentially 
fundamentalist and “born again” variety entered politics because politics attacked 
them. It is thus impossible to understand American fundamentalist religiosity en-
tering politics without realizing that it was essentially a self defense mechanism.103 
Th e liberal progressive erasure of a classical liberal line between the private and the 
political, when the New Left  slogan “the private is political” has in fact been accepted 
by modern liberalism, and the rise of the federal government to be a vehicle of im-
plementing social programs of a “Good Society”, have given the fundamentalists and 
102 R.J. Neuhaus, While We’re at Th at, “First Th ings” June/July 2006, p. 67–68; see also M. Olansky, 
Add, Don’t Subtract: How Christian Conservatives Should Engage American Culture [in:] Ch.W. Dunn (ed.), 
Th e Future of Conservatism: Confl ict and Consensus in the Post-Reagan Era, ISI Books, Wilmington 2007, 
p. 79–100. 
103 Th is was indicated by one of the contenders for the US presidency on the Republican side in 2008 
Mike Huckabee. Huckabee, at the same time a fundamentalism pastor, in the farewell speech as a chair-
man of the Baptist State Convention in Arkansas said “We do not change the world if we do not take part 
in the institutions deciding about the direction, in which marches our society”. As a governor of Arkansas he 
remarked in 1998 yet that “I did not enter politics because I thought that the state has better solutions. To the 
contrary, I knew that the state has no true solutions, that the only true solution depends on accepting Jesus 
Christ to our life”, quoted in L. Clarke, Pastor prezydentem USA?, “Dziennik”, 19–20 January 2008, p. 13.
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born-again Christians essentially a very little space for an autonomous activity. Th ey 
knew that to survive they had to enter politics because politics entered their private 
world, threatening its autonomous status. 
But one form of Protestant fundamentalism has essentially always been an enemy 
of liberalism yet at a deeper metaphysical sense, exhibiting an essentially antinomian, 
anti-commercial and anti-capitalist stance of a certain abnegation towards the mate-
rial. Th at was, for instance, the essence of the Southern Protestant civilization which 
was somehow mired in a peculiar stance of metaphysics inimical to bourgeois com-
mercialism well into the 60’s, and even today is a home to the most fundamentalist 
religious thinking, and a particular approach to culture, best captured by the writings 
of the Southern Agrarians in the 30’s and 40’s, and writings of their late, post-liberal 
heirs like Genovese. 
Fundamentalists, at a social and political level are to contemporary liberals a hor-
rible, menacing crowd. But the confl ict is much deeper. Fundamentalists in America, 
as well as in Latin America or Africa, are probably the last people who deeply believe 
in metaphysical life as an organic whole, they are the last Mohicans of the meta-
physical culture in the West, the truly antinomians, who have challenged the liberal 
self-righteous culture and monistic liberals, exposing their smugness which has led 
America and the West into a religious void, a cultural abyss. Such fundamentalists, 
paradoxically, try to live in modernity in a very confusing, maddeningly contradic-
tory ways, resembling the famous injunction of St. Augustine from his On the Gospel 
of St. John “Understanding is the reward of faith. Do not therefore try to understand 
in order that you may believe; but believe in order that you may understand”. Th is 
stance was best captured by one of the most profound metaphysical American writers 
Flannery O’Connor, the Great Daughter of the South. Th e whole opus of O’Connor 
was a defense of this metaphysical sense of the Southern culture against vaporized 
progressive liberalism. Th is progressive liberalism claimed O’Connor, became the 
new American civil religion which was successfully converting faith into individual 
preference, and in its modern versions, also in religious masks converting faith into 
psychotherapeutic preference for a psychological well being of people of happiness in 
a common, organized by welfare state civilization of “love”.104
O’Connor was recalcitrantly unpluralistic, insisting that metaphysical orthodoxy, 
‘dogma’, was instrumental for penetrating reality and only the fundamentalists of the 
South possessed it. To her, the Southern backwoods fundamentalists were, to use 
the biblical phrase popularized in modern times by Matthew Arnold and T.S. Eliot, 
“the saving remnant” of the civilization. Fundamentalists still saw the Bible as objec-
tive truth and kept hold of the supernatural which made them a powerful witness to 
a modern corrupted, materialistic age. Th e South was moral and metaphysical not 
104 Th is is also a stance expressed again in 2008 by Mike Huckabee, who said about his work: “At the 
beginning I approached [my task] very idealistically, with a conviction that the majority of my faithful ex-
pected me to be a captain of a warship, which carries the God’s troops into the battle to change the face of the 
world. With the passing years I was coming to a conviction that the people want me to be a captain of a love 
ship, on the board of which all have a wonderful time”, L. Clarke, Pastor... 
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because it produced the better people morally. O’Connor was from the South and 
knew its demons of the past and of the present. It was moral because it was still in its 
religious fundamentalist culture not so much Christ-centered as, in her memorable 
phrase, “Christ haunted”. For her this metaphysical sensibility was crucial to the pres-
ervation of civilization as such. It prevented a conceit of liberal utopianism. It kept in 
mind an image of man as a person not of himself and for himself, it retained a sense 
of sin, damnation and salvation not as just as inward states of consciousness,but as 
objective states of both immediate existence and fi nal destiny of humans. 
O’Connor, unlike the other Southern Agrarians in the 30’s, did not make this civi-
lization of the South the answer to modern barbarism of which the tepid hubristic 
progressive liberalism was just a false fi g leaf. It was religion which was such a de-
fense, and the South and its fundamentalism just happened to possess this sensibil-
ity in the most striking, even if in the most disorderly and confusing way, pointing 
to a transcendental reference in human existence, the most conspicuous preserva-
tion of the Pilgrims obsessive millenarian “errand into a wilderness”. O’Connor, who 
is beginning to assume the central role in the American cultural pantheon, herself 
paradoxically a pre-Vatican II and at the same time a post-Vatican II Catholic in the 
tradition of John Paul II and Benedict XVI, found in the obscure fundamentalist 
Protestants of the South an embodiment of real, vital and true America and its great-
ness. At the time of her writings in the 50’s they were not noticed, for their time, and 
the time of their America had not yet come. 
Judging from a hindsight she was a prophet, being also a forerunner of the re-
ligious antiracist approach to race scandal in the South. She possessed the same 
sensibility which prompted Martin Luther King, nomen omen her contemporary 
and a Baptist minister, to launch the civil rights movement, which had essentially 
religious, biblical inspiration, considering racism a scandal off ending God himself, 
and at the same time an American promise of the “Declaration of Independence”. 
O’Connor was intimating also a future corruption of the ethics of equality against 
natural law and biblical teachings transcending race, with the progressive liberal ap-
proach treating it as a springboard for building its elitist pretentions of being better 
than the majority of Americans.105 
Th is “saving remnant” of the South of her time, also visible in the writings of 
her contemporary Walker Percy, as well as in innumerable charity works of the 
Christian and Jewish communities, constituted a warning against America of lib-
eral smugness, combined with a hubristic belief of the social transformation by 
means of the state. It was also in the best tradition of American religious as well as 
secular jeremiad of going back to the roots of American greatness, the Holy Grail of 
American promise from the beginning, which being the most entrepreneurial and 
individualistic had at the same time metaphysical roots. Th ey geared these down to 
earth, democratic and materialistic impulses, to the religious-haunted conscious-
105 A fascinating study of O’Connor stressing this religious aspect of fundamentalism as a “saving 
remnant” against progressive dead end elitist liberalism see R.C. Wood, Flannery O’Connor and the Christ-
Haunted South, William B. Eerdmans Publishers Company, Grand Rapids, MI 2004.
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ness and to common republican good. In Walker Percy’s novel of 1971 Love in 
the Ruins Percy’s protagonist-antagonist Dr. Th omas More tried to unite both the 
Christians and secularists, the liberals and conservatives, the blacks and whites of 
the region in which he lived, to serve the common good conceived in terms of lib-
eral progressivism, separating the Church from the State in the most brutal way of 
pushing the faith into the cellar.
What Percy was suggesting, anticipating a rebirth of religious orthodoxy across 
America, an alliance of religious people united against debilitating civilization on 
which ruins the regnant progressive liberalism singed “hallelujah”, was a recovery 
of roots. By the end of the 20th century the liberal progressive gospel of progress 
and enlightenment which caused the greatest material civilization and the most 
charitable at the same one, which wrote in its founding document of the “Declara-
tion of Independence” that no one could be treated as chattel or plant and people of 
all races, colors, and creeds were due basic fairness and justice of citizenship, this 
civilization has cut itself off  from the essentially religious roots of its inspiration 
grounded deeply in Christian caritas. Th is civilization has committed innumerable 
sins but at the same time has been able to recover itself in the true sense of religious 
revivals, which have always been the greatest source of its vitality converted into 
social programs. 
Th is revivalist spirit of religiously haunted consciousness, stretched across time, 
from the Puritan preachers, through Lincoln, Bryant, King to name just a few, ani-
mated at the same time the great secular minds of America. But this spirit seems to 
be converted today into a debilitating liberal progressivism, using the state for the 
operation of the intellectually devised programs. Th is liberal progressivism created at 
the same time an arrogant caste of manipulative intellectuals who treat the nations as 
its property for the sake of social experimentations. Th e latter seem to be conducted 
in the name of the allegedly impossible to be overcome white guilt and “emancipa-
tion” from all Western “oppressions”. Th is white guilt is used in turn as a constant 
reminder of the liberal progressivism’s moral sense of superiority, a dissociaciation of 
pure “selfs” from the recalcitrant immoral America in need of destruction, so the lat-
ter can be saved against itself. Th is liberal impulse, so well described by Christopher 
Lasch, coming from a Christian tradition, and Philip Rieff , from a Jewish tradition, 
cuts itself from solidarity with others, and in America a large part of it has been in 
a rebellion against people’s religiosity. Progressive secular liberalism is here incapable 
of understanding this metaphysical dimension of life. Th e fundamentalist and reli-
gious America reminds the Western civilization in the most brutal and chaotic way 
about this dimension, which at the same time constitutes in fact a repetition of the 
old metaphysical impulse visible in the classical political philosophy, that man rises 
above his or her city only by means of what is best in him, the impulse captured won-
derfully by St. Augustine’s quip “Love and do whatever you want”. 
Th us politics, seem to argue religious fundamentalists, is good only insofar, as it 
knows that there exists something above it, and thus above human ego, which without 
God always reverts to debased utilitarism of the impulse of the moment, expressed by 
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an individual calculus or the calculus of social policy.106 Th e fundamentalist revival, 
as well as very diverse religious attempts to keep moral issues open in the American 
public sphere, like abortion, stem cell or marriage issues, constitutes thus a reminder 
of this gravity of issues which can only be discerned in the light of truths, which al-
though are not utilitarian ones, are the truths nevertheless, an attempt to form a com-
munity drift ing away from its Christian roots. Th e fundamentalists have essentially 
reinvigorated American politics from its small liberal progressive smugness, and have 
made the American civilization divided dramatically by “culture wars”, which form at 
the same time the most vibrant front of contemporary moral debates.107 Th e rise of the 
religiously minded people in the public square has defi nitely changed America during 
the last generation, and has made it incomprehensible in largely secular Europe. But 
American religious revival cannot be understood in any other way, but as a reaction 
against the liberal monism and its cultural image of a society born out of the counter-
cultural revolution, which has caused many aspects of American life to slide into crude 
barbarism defi ned proudly by the liberal left  as “liberation” and victory of “rights”. 
Even the non-religious observers discern this radically civilized character of the 
religious presence in the public square in the best tradition of the American reform 
movements.108 Th us although it is true, as one of the commentators remarked, that 
the religious revivalists 
“have been associated culturally mainly with conservatism and politically with the Republican 
Party, (...). this was the process done by default, the suicidal change inside of the Democratic 
Party into an ideological party of the liberal-left , with its radical cultural program excluding 
religious people by defi nition”.109 
But the program of the religious Right, mainly based on a huge alliance of evan-
gelicals and Catholics was at the same time “God-infused politics of social reform”, 
a program of social reform in the best tradition of the abolitionists and the populists, 
the progressives and the suff ragettes, the civil rights crusades and even the antiwar 
activism of the middle 1960s when many of them cut their teeth. Th us
“like the Victorian reformers who strove to mitigate the worst consequences of the industrial 
revolution, religious conservatism, at its best, is a response to the excesses of the sexual revolu-
tion-the fatherless children and broken homes, the millions of abortions and the commodifi ca-
tion of human life. Th e eras aren’t parallel, but these are similarities: Th e Victorian reformers 
passed the laws against abortion that [the religious Right] yearn to restore, and waged war 
106 Th is is the basic misunderstanding, which the progressive liberals have with the fundamentalists, 
namely a constant surprise that they, “primitive” people do not understand that economic interests are 
the basic ones over the spiritual ones, and if they don’t, then the fundamentalists possess false conscious-
ness. See Th . Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, Holt & Co., New York 2004; N. Mellow, Th e State of 
Disunion: Regional Sources of Modern American Partisanship, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 
2008.
107 See on this from a liberal left  perspective S. George, Hijacking America: How the Secular and Reli-
gious Right Changed What Americans Th ink, Polity Press, Oxford 2007.
108 Th is aspect of it is especially stressed by Christopher Lasch.
109 See on that A.C. Carson, From Reagan Democrats to Social Conservatives: Hard Choices Facing the 
Pro-Family Cause [in:] Ch.W. Dunn (ed.), Th e Future of Conservatism..., p. 1001–1112. 
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against the same kind of crude, politicized Darwinism that’s associated with the contemporary 
culture of death. Given these obstacles, religious conservatives have made great strides – but 
for now, at least they changed American politics without fundamentally changing America. 
Th ere have been gains: the abortion rate has dropped, and the country is marginally pro-life 
than 30 years ago; the divorce rate has dropped as well; and the erosion of religious faith that 
prompted Time magazine to ponder the death of God has been halted, though not necessarily 
reversed. Th e push for euthanasia has been largely turned back so far, and if the courts are not 
yet prepared to overturn Roe v. Wade, there is greater reason for pro-life hope than in 1970’s or 
the Clinton years. Th ere is a good chance that the religious people like the Progressives or the 
civil rights reformers before them will someday be able to look back over the patient work of 
decades and see a nation transformed by their labors”.110
What we have here is a clear statement showing that the public rise of the reli-
giously minded people in America was done in the name of the community and was 
essentially self defensive. Th is was so, because the “liberation” of the 60’s and radical 
secular modernity began to threaten the very essence of society as such, the moral or-
der of civility. What the American society was committing was a kind of institutional 
suicide defi ned as fi nal and long awaited freedom, abandoning habits, disciplines 
and communal life in favor of “emancipation”, which in too many instances turned 
out to be a liberation into oblivion or disaster. Th e grudgingly accepted opinion, that 
the religious public presence is a civilizing cultural and social force in America, is 
only marred by one cliché, of calling the movement and its leaders “theocons”, as 
if suggesting that what we are about to have is a theocratic state despite the overtly 
humanistic eff ects of such people’s eff orts. Th is constitutes an ominous case of not 
such a subtle case of criminalization by association, when the very word “theocon” 
elicits images of theocratic government like Iran or Saudi Arabia, where ordinary life 
may be in certain aspects civilized, but the regime is horrible from the liberal point 
of view. Th is prompted Richard J. Neuhaus, the editor of an infl uential journal “First 
Th ings”, one of the major leaders of this culturally conservative, by the liberal-left  
standards of defi nition, religious coalition to remark that:
“I don’t think I’ll go along with being called a theocon, not even accepting it with ‘a wink and 
a grin’. To too many, the term inevitably implies theocracy, which is the very opposite of what 
my friends and I have been contending for all these years. I will never tire of insisting that the 
alternative to the naked public square in not the sacred public square but the civil public square. 
Th e purpose is to renew the liberal democratic tradition by, among other things, opening the 
public square to the full and civil engagement of the convictions of all citizens, including their 
religiously informed moral convictions. I am guilty as charged by some conservatives. I am 
a liberal democrat. For instance, I have argued over decades that the pro-life position is the 
position of a liberalism that has an inclusive defi nition of the community, including unborn 
children, for which we accept common responsibility. Similarly, it is the liberal position to 
support the right of parents to decide how their children should be educated through vouch-
ers or other instruments of parental choice. On these and many other questions, liberalism 
was radically redefi ned beginning in the 1960’s, with the ironic result that I and others of like 
convictions are called conservatives. Our cause is the restoration and renewal of the liberal 
democratic tradition, which is the greatest political achievement of our civilization. Th ere is 
110 R. Douthat, Th eocon Moment, “Th e Wall Street Journal”, April 6, 2006, p. A14. 
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yet another and more important reason to decline the ‘theocon’ label. No political cause and 
no political order deserves to bear the name of God. Th at honor is reserved to the Church of 
Jesus Christ, which its faith and Eucharistic liturgy enacts and anticipates the authentically new 
politics of the promised kingdom of God. America is a nation under God, but not even at its 
very best is it God’s nation”.111 
Th e covenantal mentality of the Americans is a deeply ingrained cultural code of 
a society still living in a state of nervous vigilance over its mission, its potencial and 
its promise of redemption, not only of them but eventually of the entire world. From 
a perspective of the European metaphysical boredom this is a sign of eternal immatu-
rity of Americans, kind of an adolescent fever to be discarded as quickly as possible. 
But Americans are the last heroic, self-conscious people believing in their civiliza-
tion, in fact the last people of the Western world considering it, as collectivity, worth 
preserving and defending. For this very reason this mentality of covenant, mission, 
fear of failure as well as a desire to fulfi ll the promise of their own “proposition” is 
a sign of vitality and, not a dangerous sign of a civilization which strayed into wilder-
ness of history and is slowly decaying, the fate into which, for instance, the European 
Union might have chosen to march. 
111 R.J. Neuhaus, While We’re at Th at, p. 70.
